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Abstract
In many circumstances, public goods are funded by both government revenue and
private contributions. Private contributions to public goods could achieve the same
social goals as the government-funded public goods. Certain financial aid from the
voluntary sectors reduces the heavy fiscal burdens of the public sector by sharing
the responsibilities of providing public goods and services. As an alternative to the
public provision of public goods, social planners encourage private contributions by
providing fiscal subsidies as part of the income tax policy.
My dissertation addresses the questions of whether the private provision of public
goods is welfare improving in various aspects in theory and how effective it is applied
to the Canadian tax schedule in an empirical model.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I focus on a particular case of the
consumer’s utility to investigate the effect of a government transfer to the private
donation of a public good. Unlike the classic conclusion, the influence of income
redistribution is not always neutral when I take consideration of the substitute re-
lationship between the private contributed public good and the public provision of
a public good. Then in chapter 3, I build on the traditional income tax model in
Part I and improve it to a two-stage non-cooperative game in which it encompasses
both governments funded public goods and private contributions in the optimal in-
come tax problem in Part II. Finally, in chapter 4, I apply my theoretical model
in an empirical setting using Canadian family expenditure data. I exploit this rich
data on charitable contribution in Canada to assess the effectiveness of Canadian tax
incentive towards charitable giving from the private sector. The empirical analysis
ii
illustrates that individuals in Canada are quite responsive to the change of tax in-
centive for charitable donation since price elasticity, in general, exceeds 1 in absolute
value.
iii
In dedication to my beloved grandparents.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The general field of my dissertation is in the private provision of public goods and in-
come tax policy. Various aspects of the private contributions including the crowding-
out by the public provision, subsidizing voluntary donations in non-linear income tax
policy and assessment of the effectiveness of the current Canadian tax credit regime
are brought together in the dissertation. Overall, this work consists of two compo-
nent, theoretical and empirical. Theoretical analysis in chapter 2 and chapter 3 and
empirical testing in chapter 4 are all preceded with a presentation of an appropriate
methodology and an overview of the literature.
In chapter 2, I focus on the crowding-out by the public provision of a public good.
I investigate the effect of a government transfer on private donations of a public good
by using certain consumer’s utilities. Unlike the classic conclusion, the influence of
income redistribution is not neutral when I take consideration of the substitute rela-
tionship between the public provided sector and the private contributed sector. This
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chapter clearly demonstrates that the impact depends exclusively on the elasticity
of substitution index between the publicly provided public good and the privately
provided public good. Unless the government provision of public good and the vol-
untary contribution are perfect substitutes, the crowding-out effect in most cases is
incomplete. In a particular case, the public provision of a public good may even
bring positive change to the private contribution equilibrium. Another interesting
scenario in this chapter is when the amount of publicly funded public goods equals
the amount of the privately contributed public goods, the substitution parameter
does not appear in the conditions defining the Nash Equilibrium. Therefore, the
crowding out does not depend on the elasticity of substitution any more in this spe-
cific case.
Chapter 3 analyses the voluntary contributions to public goods in the presence of
the optimal non-linear income taxation. This chapter begins with the outline of the
previous literature on the topic of both the optimal public goods provision and the
design of non-linear income taxation. This is followed by a unifying model encom-
passing both government-funded public good and private contributions in the optimal
income tax problem. One purpose of this chapter is to find out the Pareto optimal
public good provision with private donations when optimal non-linear income taxes
are present. I adopt the incentive compatibility constraint approach elucidated by
Stiglitz (1982) where the government maximizes utilities of one group subject to spe-
cific constraints. The basic question answered by this chapter is whether subsidizing
donation is welfare improving. And what level of the public good should be provided
from both the private sector and the public sector, respectively? This chapter is able
2
to provide new answers to these questions, looking at first the traditional income
tax model in which government could control over charitable giving as part of the
optimal tax policy in Part I, and then extending the analysis to a two-stage non-
cooperative game where charitable giving is endogenous in Part II. The modification
of the Samuelson Rule for the private provision or for the public provision of public
good depends on whether aggregate charitable donation or government funding pub-
lic good is a substitute or a complement to labour supply without the warm glow of
giving. After considering the two-stage non-cooperative game in an economy with
non-linear income taxes, this chapter concludes that the unique Nash equilibrium
for this game has the characteristic that only high ability individuals would make a
positive charitable donation to the public good.
Chapter 4 builds upon the theoretical analysis presented in chapter 3 and exam-
ines the subsidizing voluntary regime in Canada. Since the taxation year of 1988,
Canada has exercised the tax credit system which provides tax incentives for charita-
ble giving to Canadian taxpayers. The current tax credit system is different from the
more common tax deduction system practiced in most of the countries in the world.
This chapter aims to take advantage of the variation in the tax price of charitable
giving both across individuals within provinces and within provinces over time in
Canada to identify the extent to which peoples’ decisions of donations are influenced
by tax incentives. The results from this chapter suggest tax incentives influence the
households’ decision on how much to contribute to charitable giving significantly.
Finally, chapter 5 offers a brief conclusion and discussion of possible future ex-
tensions for this dissertation.
3
Chapter 2
Crowding-out by Public Provision
of an Imperfect Substitute
2.1 Introduction
In many circumstances, public goods are funded by the government and voluntary
private contribution together. Common analyses believe that public good would be
under-supplied by only the private donation. Therefore, governmental transfers are
needed for this deficiency. But conventional result shows that a small amount of pub-
lic provision might not solve the under-supply problem in an actual situation since
central government provision can crowd out completely voluntary private provision.
Generally, the increase in publicly provided public good will have two effects on the
amount of privately contributed public good. First, contributors may reduce their
contributions due to an increase in government spending on a public good. This is
4
known as the substitution effect. The second effect is through a contributor’s bud-
get constraint. The government collected tax will decrease contributor’s disposable
income; hence will lower the contribution to public good. This is the income effect
of the government transfer. Since those “crowding out” effects exist, government
supplied public goods may not necessarily increase the overall level of funding for
public goods.
There are several remarkable pieces of literature on this topic. Warr (1983) dis-
covers that income redistribution among private contributors will not change resource
allocation or welfare. In his model, individuals care only about the aggregate supply
of the voluntarily supplied public good and crowding out effect is exactly a dollar for
a dollar. Brennan and Pincus (1983) argue that policy change can redistribute the
resources allocation only if it changes the relative price, and they apply this finding
to analysing the growth of government expenditure. In 1984, Roberts reasserted the
neutral results that public transfer to the poor crowd out private charity one by one
by examining various types of U.S data from the 1920s to 1980s. He concluded that
public transfers reduce private charity to zero in a political equilibrium.
However, the most striking analysis came from the research done by Bergstrom
et al. in 1986. They consider a general model in which a unique voluntary Nash
equilibrium exists. In their article, the consumer only cares about his own private
consumption and the aggregate supply of public good and he assumes that the con-
tributions of others would be independent of his contribution. They discover wealth
redistribution among contributing individuals will not change the equilibrium level
of the public good if it does not alter the contributing set for consumers. But large
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income redistribution will alter the provision of public good since it changes the
contributor set. Further, they find out that government transfer will decrease the
private contribution but will actually increase the overall amount of the public good
being provided.
In addition, there are empirical evidence on the topic of crowding-out; but much
of these findings are contradictory. Kingma (1989) examines the effect of govern-
ment support on individual provision by a two stage instrumental variable study. He
discovers that the crowding out effect is less than one. Similarly, Hungerman (2005)
demonstrates the crowding out effect of church-provided welfare by government wel-
fare. The estimated “crowd-out” effect is between 20 and 38 cents for a dollar in his
article.
The vast majority of the articles I mentioned above consider a general public
good model in which the consumer only cares about their consumption for private
good and the aggregate amount of a public good. Nevertheless, there are still doubts
with the validity of the assumption that individuals are “pure altruistic”. One alter-
native public good model, studied by Andreoni (1989), introduced impure altruism
into the utility function. Andreoni believes people will get a “warm glow” from a
contribution, that is, when an individual voluntarily contributes to a public good,
they may obtain utility from the act of giving as well as from increasing total supply
of the public good. In this study, he finds out that government provided public good
or charity will incompletely crowd out private gifts, specifically, progressive tax may
actually increase charitable giving rather than decrease it, as in conventional result.
Moreover, there are other different approaches that address the dual-provision
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issue, but focus more on the provision of private goods. Epple and Romano (1996a)
evaluate government’s role in providing public provision by discussing a majority
voting model in which majority voting equilibrium always exists and median-income
voter is pivotal. In this equilibrium, a coalition of rich and poor agents with rich
choosing the private alternative of a service will oppose median income agents that
consume public provision. Further, Epple and Romano (1996b) investigate that a
coalition of rich and poor households prefer reduced public provision, while the mid-
dle class prefer an increase. Lu¨lfesmann and Myers (2011) develop the ER’s model
and find that when an equilibrium with positive taxes exists, the dual-provision
regime is usually strictly majority dominates either a system of pure private provision
or one of pure government provision. Based on those arguments, both government
participation and private market are indispensable in operating some critical public
sectors in a nation, such as health care or the education sector.
Despite the existence of different beliefs in prior studies, this chapter primarily
follows the work done by Bergstrom et al. (1986) in which people are pure altruistic.
Each consumer’s preferences are assumed to depend on his private consumption and
the sum of everyone’s voluntary contributions (Bergstrom et al., 1986). They assume
the total gifts of others will be independent of his own gifts. This is a model that
much literature has established on a theoretical basis; therefore, I believe the study
of this model may produce interesting results and is also worth further discussion. In
this analysis, I focus on a special case of the utility form for a consumer to investigate
the effect of a government transfer on the private donation of a public good. Unlike
the classic conclusion, the influence of income redistribution is not neutral when I
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take consideration of the substitute relationship between public provided sector and
private contributed sector. It suggests that the influence depends exclusively on the
elasticity of substitution index between publicly provided public good and privately
provided public good. Unless the government provision of a public good and vol-
untary contribution are perfect substitutes, the crowding out effect in most cases is
incomplete. Furthermore, public provision of a public good may even bring positive
change to the private donation equilibrium in a particular case. This contradicts the
common neutral hypothesis but may have more predictive power in the empirical
observation for the public provision of a public good.
This chapter is organized along the following lines. The next section presents a
theoretical framework to explain the basic setting of the model. Section 3.3 discusses
the findings from the model. Section 3.4 presents the conclusion.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 Basic Model
Suppose there is one public good, one private good and n consumers. Assume all
consumers will have homogeneous preferences. Each consumer i spends an amount
of xi on private consumption. A consumer’s income is wi, if wi > w
∗, he belongs to
the group of contributors, and he will contribute a positive amount ξi to the private
provision of the public good. He will allocate his wealth between consumption of
8
private good and donation to the public good,
xi + ξi = wi,
If wi 5 w∗, a consumer decides to make zero contribution to the private provision of
public good. People in this group, their budget constraint will be,
xi = wi,
The richest M people choose to contribute in equilibrium, here I assume each
contributor is identical (i.e. they have same preferences and same incomes). This
assumption is essential for the neutrality result, that is, equalizing wealth redistri-
bution among current non-contributors or among current contributors will leave the
equilibrium supply unchanged1. The total supply of private provision of the public
good is Z1 =
M∑
i=1
ξi. I define Z1−i = Z1 − ξi, which is the sum of all private contribu-
tions to public good except consumer i’s contribution.
The utility function for each consumer is
u(xi, Z1),
Let D(1, wi +Z1−i) be a consumer i’s demand function for the privately provided
public good, all consumers will have the same demand function for the public good
since they have identical tastes. Let x be the numeraire good and its price is 1.
1Theorem 5 in Bergstrom et al. (1986)
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Define y = wi+Z1−i , a consumer’s demand function for private provision of public
good with the inequality constraint before tax is
Z1 = max{Di(1, y), Z1−i}.
The following conditions define a Nash equilibrium2 for the private provision of public
good,
Z1 = Di(1, wi + Z1−i), if consumer i belongs to contributors;
Z1 = Dj(1, wj + Z1−j). if consumer j contribute zero gift.
If consumers are identical, we will get D(1, wi + (m − 1)ξi) = mξi, where m is the
number of consumers who are actually contributing to the public good.
A Nash equilibrium in this model is a vector of private donation (ξ∗i ), i =
1, 2, 3.......n, such that for each i, (x∗i , ξ
∗
i ) solves,
max
xi,ξi
ui(xi,ξi + Z1−i)
s.t xi + ξi = wi,
ξi = 0.
For a consumer who makes zero contribution to the private donation of public good,
Z1 = Z1−i . However, for a consumer who makes a positive contribution, his donation
will make Z1 > Z1−i . Therefore, the maximization problem for a consumer can also
2See Bergstrom et al. (1986) for the proof of existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium.
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be written as
max
xi,Z1
ui(xi,Z1)
s.t xi + Z1 = wi + Z1−i ,
Z1 = Z1−i .
Now, suppose the government starts to collect taxes ti from those consumers.
Since all contributors have same income and same tastes, they will pay the same
amount of tax. The total amount of taxes collected by the government is
n∑
i=1
ti. Z2
represents a new public good that is being funded by the government tax which is
not exactly the same as Z1. This is a different assumption compared with prior
literature; since they assume government-provided public good is exactly the same
as the privately provided one, this may be unrealistic in the actual situation. The
new utility function for a consumer is
u(xi, Z1, Z2),
However, now consumers have to spend their money on the private good, taxes, and
also on the private donation if wi > w
∗. New y = wi − ti + Z1−i .
11
The new vector that defines a Nash Equilibrium would be (x∗i , Z
∗
1) solves,
max
xi,Z1
ui(xi,Z1, Z2)
s.t xi + ti + Z1 = wi + Z1−i ,
Z1 = Z1−i .
When the government is providing Z2, the demand function for a consumer has
changed. New demand function of a contributor for the private provision of public
good will depend on three elements: the price of the privately provided public good,
income, and the quantity of the government-provided public good. Thus, the new
demand function of a contributor for the private provision of public good after tax
would be
D(1, wi − ti + (m− 1)ξi, Z2) = mξi.
2.2.2 Equilibrium Conditions
Suppose that consumer’s preference can be represented by the utility function
U(x, Z1, Z2) = f(x)[(Z1)
ρ + (Z2)
ρ]1/ρ, ρ ≤ 1.
for some concave function f(x)3. σ = 1
1−ρ is the elasticity of substitution between
the privately provided public good and the publicly provided public good, where ρ
is a constant and could be negative.
3This case includes the Cobb-Douglas case, in which f(x) = xα.
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Since all consumers are identical, I will neglect the subscript i from now on.
Then the marginal rate of substitution between the private good x, and the privately
provided public good Z1 is
MRS ≡ Ux
UZ1
= Z1
[
1 +
(
Z2
Z1
)ρ]
f ′(x)
f(x)
. (2.2.2.1)
If the price of the private good x is 1, and the price of the privately provided
public good is also 1, then the demand functions for the goods are determined by
the conditions MRS = 1 (where the MRS is defined by equation 2.2.2.1), and by
the budget constraint x + Z1 = y. So with voluntary provision of the public good,
the equilibrium levels of Z1 and x are determined by the conditions:
Z1
[
1 +
(Z2
Z1
)ρ]f ′(x)
f(x)
− 1 = 0, (2.2.2.2)
and
x+ Z1 = w − t+ m− 1
m
Z1. (2.2.2.3)
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Taxes Equal the Cost to Finance the Public Sector
Suppose first that the tax t paid by each contributor equals her share Z2/m of the
cost of the public good. In this case, equation 2.2.2.3 indicates that if each person
lowered her contribution ξ ≡ Z1/m to provision of the privately provided public good
by t, then the budget constraint would still be satisfied. So when t = Z2/m, the
13
changes will satisfy the budget constraint.
4Z1 = −Z2; 4ξ = −t; 4x = 0,
If Z1 and Z2 are perfect substitutes, then these changes will also ensure that equation
2.2.2.2 still holds. So the special case in which ρ = 1 yields the familiar result of full
crowding out when the two goods are perfect substitutes.
Proof. Define:
F = Z1
[
1 +
(Z2
Z1
)ρ]f ′(x)
f(x)
− 1 = 0, (2.3.1.1)
FZ2 = ρ
(Z2
Z1
)ρ−1f ′(x)
f(x)
, (2.3.1.2)
FZ1 =
[
1 + (1− ρ)
(Z2
Z1
)ρ]f ′(x)
f(x)
, (2.3.1.3)
dZ1
dZ2
=
−ρ(Z2
Z1
)ρ−1 f
′(x)
f(x)
[1 + (1− ρ)(Z2
Z1
)ρ]f
′(x)
f(x)
=
−ρ(Z2
Z1
)ρ−1
1 + (1− ρ)(Z2
Z1
)ρ
(2.3.1.4)
=
−ρ(
Z2
Z1
)1−ρ
+ (1− ρ)
(
Z2
Z1
) .
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If Z1 and Z2 are perfect substitutes, in which case we have ρ = 1, equation 2.3.1.4
becomes,
dZ1
dZ2
= −1.
This yields the conventional full crowding out result.
Suppose ρ < 04, that is, Z1 and Z2 are pretty weak substitutes. Then it must
have less than full crowding out : if Z2 increases, and Z1 decreases by the same
amount as the increase in Z2, then the original quantity of x would still satisfy the
budget constraint 2.2.2.3. However, if ρ < 0, the increase in Z2 will decrease the left
side of 2.2.2.2 and so will cause a decrease in Z1, such that first-order condition will
not be satisfied if x is unchanged. The only way to restore the first-order condition
is to increase Z1 a little, and to decrease x
5: so the increase in Z2 does not fully
crowd out private provision of Z1.
However, when 0 < ρ < 1, increases in Z2 will increase the left side of equation
2.2.2.2, so that it is not necessarily the case that complete crowding out must decrease
the left side of 2.2.2.2. It is possible that more than 100% crowding arises : for
example, if ρ = 0.9, and we start out with Z2 = 0, then a small increase in Z2,
funded by taxes on contributors, must lead to a fall in private provision Z1 which
is greater in magnitude than the increase in Z2
6. It can be seen in the proof that
4If ρ = 0, then dZ1/dZ2 = 0. It shows that when Z1 and Z2 have not so strong substitutes
relationship, the provision of Z2 may not have any impact on the amount of public good being
privately provided.
5Both Z1 and x have to change because there is still a budget constraint; the starting point was
full crowding out which will satisfy the budget constraint if the contributors are paying all the cost
of the Z2 increase. Thus moving away from complete crowding out would mean an increase in Z1,
that implies x must decease to keep the budget constraint hold.
6Suppose, for example that ρ = 0.9. Then the left side of equation 2.2.2.2 will actually increase
if we increase Z2 from 0 to 1, and decrease Z1 from 9 to 8. That is, increasing Z2, paying for it
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dZ1/dZ2 is not monotonic when ρ is in the range between 0 and 1.
Proof.
dZ1/dZ2
dρ
=
−[(Z2
Z1
)1−ρ + (1− ρ)(Z2
Z1
)] + ρ[−(Z2
Z1
)1−ρ ln
(Z2
Z1
)
− (Z2
Z1
)]
[(Z2
Z1
)1−ρ + (1− ρ)(Z2
Z1
)]2
=
−(Z2
Z1
)1−ρ − (1− ρ)
(Z2
Z1
)
− ρ
(Z2
Z1
)1−ρ
ln(Z2
Z1
)− ρ(Z2
Z1
)
[(Z2
Z1
)1−ρ + (1− ρ)(Z2
Z1
)]2
(2.3.1.5)
=
−(Z2
Z1
)1−ρ[1 + ρ ln(Z2
Z1
)]− (Z2
Z1
)
[(Z2
Z1
)1−ρ + (1− ρ)(Z2
Z1
)]2
,
when 0 < ρ < 1.
2.3.2 No Taxes Raised from Contributors
The polar opposite case is the case in which the government increases its provision
Z2 of the publicly provided public good without levying any taxes on contributors
to the privately provided public good. In that case, the original (x∗, Z∗1) pair which
satisfy 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3 when Z2 = 0 will still satisfy the budget constraint 2.2.2.3
after an increase in Z2. So the contributors will want to increase x, and decrease
Z1, in response to the increase in Z2, if and only if the left side of equation 2.2.2.2
increases when Z2 increases. This suggests the following:
through taxes on contributors, and decreasing Z1 by the same amount (holding private consumption
constant), will increase the consumer’s MRS between private good x and privately-provided public
good Z1, so that consumers will decrease contributions by MORE than their taxes, in order to
restore equilibrium.
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Corollary 1 If an increase in the publicly provided public good Z2 is provided for
free to contributors, then aggregate contributions will increase in response to this
increase in public provision if and only if ρ < 07.
2.3.3 Government-Provided Public Good Equals Private
Contributed Public Good
Generalizing the previous two subsections’ specifications of how the public sector is
financed, suppose that each contributor paid some share τ of the cost of the public
sector, so that the equilibrium with voluntary contribution would be defined by
Z1
[
1 +
(Z2
Z1
)ρ]f ′(x)
f(x)
− 1 = 0,
and
x+ Z1 = w − τZ2 + m− 1
m
Z1. (2.3.3.1)
In many cases, increasing in Z2 leads to a decrease in private contributions, so that Z1
falls as Z2 increases. So suppose, for some value of ρ, public expenditure is increased
so much that Z1 = Z2. The levels of x˜, Z˜1 and Z˜2 for which this happens are defined
7The proof is easily seen as when ρ < 0, dZ1/dZ2 > 0; that means an increase in public provision
of Z2 may actually lead to an increase in voluntary contributions.
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by
2Z˜2
f ′(x˜)
f(x˜)
= 1 (2.3.3.2)
x˜+
(
1
m
+ τ
)
Z˜2 = w (2.3.3.3)
Z˜1 = Z˜2 (2.3.3.4)
The substitution parameter ρ does not enter into equations 2.3.3.2-2.3.3.4, which
suggests the following:
Corollary 2 For any financing rule for the public sector, there is some level of
provision of the publicly provided public good, Z˜2, such that the extent of crowding
out, if the government increases public good provision from 0 to Z˜2, does not vary
with the elasticity of substitution between the privately provided public good and the
publicly provided public good.
2.4 Concluding Remark
This chapter focuses on the study of the demand function approach for public provi-
sion of a public good studied by Bergstrom et al in 1986 and extends it into a special
constant elasticity of substitution utility case. In addition, this research takes into
account the fact that public provision of a public good is not exactly the same as
the private provision. In particular, the crowding out effect found in this analysis
varies with the elasticity of substitution between the privately provided public good
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and the public provided public good in most scenarios. Under certain assumptions,
when public financed public good and private provision of public good are perfect
substitutes, the crowding out effect is complete; this is consistent with the prior
research. However, when government provision and voluntary provision of public
good are weak substitutes, the crowding out effect is less than 100%; in the extreme
case when taxes are not collected from the donors in an economy, the aggregate
supply of the public good may even increase instead of being unchanged or decrease.
Moreover, it proposes that government provision of public good may not necessarily
crowd out the privately contributed sector by a dollar for a dollar if their elasticity of
substitution index is between 0 and 1; it is possible that more than a 100% crowding
out effect may arise in this case. Another interesting scenario in this chapter is when
governmentally funded public good equals private contributed public good; in this
case, the substitution parameter does not appear in the conditions that define Nash
Equilibrium. Hence, the crowding out effect does not depend on the elasticity of
substitution any more at this specific level.
There are several significant policy implications from this finding. First of all,
government transfer can influence consumers’ decision on the amount of contribution
to the public good; therefore government should attempt to better understand this
negative effect when increasing the public funded public good in order to design the
optimal policy and further improve the social welfare. Secondly, in some public sec-
tors, especially when public provided public good and private provided public good
are fairly weak substitutes, if government raises the tax in a proper way, government
grants may actually increase the total supply of public good.
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Further research is needed for examining the theory by applying it into an exper-
imental or econometric experiment. It still requires empirical observation to verify
the validity of this theory in the real world.
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Chapter 3
Voluntary Private Contributions
to Public Goods and the Optimal
Non-linear Income Tax
3.1 Introduction
The rule for the public goods provision under optimal income tax schedule has
always been a highly controversial topic among tax policy analysts in Western
Europe and North America since the mid-1950s. The earliest work can be traced
back as long ago as Pigou (1947), who notes that there exists the possibility of
indirect damage cost on society, when transferring resources from the private sector
to the public sector. In particular, if the lump-sum transfer is not available, then
the result according to Samuelson, for the public goods provision might no longer
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define the optimum. Samuelson Rule is a Pareto optimal condition for the public
good provision, in which the aggregate marginal rate of substitution between a
public good and a chosen private good should be equal to the marginal rate of
transformation. When the Samuelson Rule is satisfied, the social welfare function
is maximized. It is undeniable that the Samuelson Rule laid the foundation for
future theoretical reformation of the optimal public goods provision. However, the
optimum depends solely on the presence of efficient lump-sum taxation, which is
almost impossible to achieve in reality, since the government has restrictions on
observing characteristics of individuals, when redistributing income.
Later on, Atkinson and Stern (1974) provide a detailed analysis to elucidate that
under certain circumstances, Pigou’s interpretation about the Conventional Rule1
overestimating the true benefit, when raising government revenue, went wrong.
They followed the work of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Stiglitz and Dasgupta
(1971), and constructed a model in which a set of commodity taxes is employed
by the government to finance public goods expenditure. They broke down the
conventional benefit measure into two effects, when government revenue is raised
by the distortionary tax. On the one hand, there is a distortionary effect that
Pigou proposed as the excess burden. On the other hand, there is a revenue effect
overlooked by Pigou which depends on the choice of which consumption goods are
taxed. If those two effects are combined together, then the result turns out be that
the Conventional Rule could overestimate the marginal benefit of public goods or
even underestimate it.
1Atkinson and Stern (1974) referred to the Conventional Rule as using
∑
MRS as a measure
of marginal benefit.
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In the mean time, the design for optimal non-linear income taxation structure
has made a spurt advance for the past century. The most striking breakout theory is
due to Mirrlees (1971); he brought out the attention of optimal non-linear tax rate
on both high and low incomes. With the recognition of a trade-off between equality
and efficiency, Mirrlees’s research predicts, under certain assumptions for the utility
function, the optimal income tax schedule is approximately linear. The significant
advance over Mirrlees’s theory was the design of an efficient screening mechanism to
find the Pareto efficient income tax structure pioneered by Stiglitz (1982). Stiglitz
(1987) later describes his theory as The New New Welfare Economics, in which he
introduced the self-selection constraint to the design of income tax schedule. He
proposes that the optimal tax structure has the property of a zero marginal tax rate
on high ability individuals, whereas positive marginal rate on low ability individuals.
It is important to note that the model presented here is intrinsically related to the
analysis of non-linear optimal income taxation.
Although the theory of optimal public provision continues to develop and ma-
ture, the fact that subsidizing voluntary contribution to public good could possibly
achieve the same social goals as the public provision got less focus. Public goods
generally can be financed by public spending or tax-favoured voluntary contribu-
tions. Tax incentives are especially important for those charity organizations where
direct government expenditure is forbidden. For instance, religious organizations
rely heavily on private donation. However, only a few studies showed the evidence
of voluntary contributions under optimal income taxation. Atkinson (1976) studies
the income tax treatment of charitable contributions and examines whether tax
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deduction should be replaced by a proportional tax credit through a logarithmic
utility function form. Feldstein (1980) compares a direct government spending
scheme with a tax subsidy for private charitable giving as an extension of the theory
of commodity taxation. Saez (2004) develops the optimal linear tax treatment of tax
expenditure by using empirically estimable parameters and numerical calibration.
He shows that the optimal subsiding rate on private provision contribution to the
public good is related to several interacted parameters between the public provision
and the private provision such as the size of the crowding out effect and the size of
the price elasticity of contributions.
Yet no studies thus far have researched on the public good provision from both
public and private sectors under the optimal income taxation subject to the incentive
compatibility constraint. The present analysis in this chapter is able to develop
a unifying model encompassing both government funded public goods and private
contributions in the optimal income tax problem. One purpose of this chapter is
to find out the Pareto optimal public good provision with the private donation
when optimal non-linear income tax is present. I adopt an incentive compatibility
constraint approach elucidated by Stiglitz (1982) where the government maximizes
utilities of one group subject to several constraints including incentive compatibility
constraints. This chapter builds up an optimal non-linear tax model in which
individuals in the economy not only obtain utility from contributing the private
donation to public good but also derive utility from the overall increase of public
good from the private sector. The government also provides expenditure on the
public good from distortionary income tax revenue. To raise public funds, the
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government chooses a tax schedule, constrained by the requirement that taxes levied
on the two types of people must satisfy a selection constraint: high-wage people
cannot be better off choosing to earn the same income as low-wage people, paying
lower taxes and donating less private donations.
The basic question answered by this analysis therefore is whether subsidizing
donation is welfare improving. And what level of the public good should be provided
from the private sector and the public sector, respectively? This chapter of the thesis
is able to provide new answers to these questions, looking first at the traditional
income tax model in which government could control over the charitable giving
as part of the optimal income tax policy, and then extending the analysis to a
two-stage non-cooperative game where the charitable giving is endogenous. Here an
individual’s taxes can be a non-linear function of her income, but the tax credit rate
for charitable contributions is assumed constant (for all people in the economy). In
this game, the government sets the optimal income tax schedule based on observable
individual characteristics at the first stage and individuals will then choose their
labour supply and charitable contribution based on government’s policy at the final
stage.
When the government deploys an optimal non-linear income tax schedule, then
the conditions for the optimal provision of public good depend on whether the public
provision of the public good and the private provision of the public good are perfect
substitutes with the warm glow of giving. The modification of the Samuelson Rule
for the private provision or for public provision of public good depending on whether
aggregate charitable donation or government funding public good is a substitute or
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complement to labour supply without warm glow of giving. However, when there
exists a warm glow of giving, the modification of the Samuelson Rule for the private
provision depending on whether the warm glow is a substitute or a complement to
labour supply with separability in the public provision and the private provision.
Both types of people will receive a positive income tax credit when increasing
private donation to the public good in this economy. After considering the two-stage
non-cooperative game in an economy with non-linear taxes, this chapter concludes
that the unique Nash equilibrium for this game has the property that only high
ability individuals would make a positive charitable donation to public good.
Closest to this research are those of Boadway and Keen (1993) and Diamond
(2006). Boadway and Keen follow upon Stiglitz (1982), and use the self-selection
approach to analyse the optimal provision of public goods. As a matter of fact,
they only limit their study to the optimal policy for public good from the public
sector and individuals can not voluntarily contribute to public good in their model.
Economies with only the public provision or those with the private provision alone
should be considered as the two extreme cases. As the existence of charitable giving
indicates, public goods are usually provided by a combination of both ways. Dia-
mond (2006) argues that subsidized donations have two sides of the potential gain
to social welfare. First, more redistribution is going to taken place after subsidizing
donation, therefore it can raise social welfare. Second, private contribution to public
good can ease resource constraint by possibly reducing private consumption. In
Diamond’s paper, he assumes that working hours for individuals are fixed, people
can choose either to participate in the labour force, or not participate at all. That
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is, Diamond only considers the extensive margin2 upon the labor supply response.
Unlike Diamond’s model, individuals are able to choose their working hours in the
model presented here. This analysis includes the voluntary provision of public goods
in the “intensive margin” model of optimal income taxation, in which people differ
in unobservable ability, and can vary endogenously their hours of work. Feldstein
(1980) and Roberts (1987) investigated the efficiency of tax expenditure for charita-
ble gifts to the public good, but they approach in a fairly different model.
The third chapter of my thesis is organized as two parts in general. In Part I, I
will introduce private donation as part of the optimal income taxation problem in
which government could offer two different packages of consumption bundle to the
two-type individuals. Section 3.2 describes the general framework of this analysis
with the simplest case of a non-linear optimal income taxation model. In section 3.3,
I derive the optimal public good provision rule for both public sector and private
sector. Section 3.4 introduces some special forms in individual tastes and in section
3.5, I give a brief discussion about the optimal tax deduction rule. Furthermore, in
Part II, I construct a two-stage non-cooperative game with the private donation to
the public good. Section 3.6 to 3.9 develop the two-stage game for this economy.
Section 3.10 and 3.11 discuss the general results and policy implication derived
from this model. Finally, section 3.12 offers concluding remarks. Like preceding
literature, I assume raising public good fund from both public sector and private
sector is costless. The problem of the excess burden is obviously important but it
2This is sometimes called the “extensive margin” model of optimal income taxation. For gen-
eral discussion of the difference between extensive margin and intensive margin in labour supply
response, see Saez (2002).
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complicates the framework, and therefore is better assumed away. In this sense,
the analysis might be more valuable in enlightening the structure of the contention
about public good provision than in giving a direct solution to policy.
28
Part I
Private Contribution in Incentive
Compatibility Constraint
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3.2 The Simplest Case
The present analysis builds upon the preceding model developed by Stiglitz (1982).
Throughout this chapter, I consider two types of individuals, more able and less
able, differing only in their labouring skills. Everyone has the same utility function
and consumes a single private good which is produced by the two types of labours.
Individual of type i faces a before tax wage (output per hour) of wi. In the absence
of taxation, his budget constraint is simply
ci = wiLi − gi, (3.2.0.1)
where ci is private consumption, Li is the number of hours worked (Li could also be
interpreted as being effort) and gi is his contribution to the privately provided public
good (not his consumption) which he may choose to contribute voluntarily. Neither
wi or Li is separately observable, but
Yi = wiLi, (3.2.0.2)
the total income, is observable. It ought to be noticed that since labour supply
hours and wage rate are imperceptible individually, one cannot surmise ability for
each individual. Each individual receives utility from consuming the private good
ci, the private donation gi, the aggregate private provided of public good G and the
government financed public good H. However, individuals get disutility from work.
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The utility function for type i is
U i = U i(ci, gi, G,H, Li), (3.2.0.3)
where ∂U i/∂ci > 0, ∂U
i/∂Li < 0, ∂U
i/∂gi > 0, ∂U i/∂G > 0, ∂U i/∂H > 03. Here
I kept the traditional assumptions about the individuals’ utility function, that is, U
is quasi-concave and continuously differentiable. Assume now that the government
imposes a tax as a function of income and charitable contributions so as to raise
government revenue
Ti = T (wiLi, gi) = T (Yi, gi), (3.2.0.4)
The individual’s consumption now is his income minus both private contribution
to public good and his tax payments
ci = wiLi − gi − T (Yi, gi), (3.2.0.5)
An individual of type i maximizes his utility function subject to his budget con-
straint
max
{ci,gi,Li}
U i(ci, gi, G,H, Li)
s.t ci ≤ wiLi − gi − T (wiLi, gi),
(3.2.0.6)
3∂U/∂gi > 0 if (and only if) there is a warm glow from giving.
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In this maximization problem, Yi and Ti (and therefore ci) are the only observable
variables. Hence, we can rewrite utility function in terms of the observable variables
U = U i(ci, gi, G,H,
Yi
wi
) ≡ V i(ci, gi, G,H, Yi;wi), (3.2.0.7)
In brief, this model will consider five goods: the private consumption ci, the
private contribution gi, the aggregate level of private contribution to public good G,
the aggregate level of public provision of public good through income tax H and the
total income Yi. For later reference,
∂V i
∂ci
=
∂U i
∂ci
;
∂V i
∂gi
=
∂U i
∂gi
;
∂V i
∂Yi
=
∂U
∂Li
1
wi
;
∂V i
∂wi
= −∂U
i
∂Li
Y
w2i
= −∂V
i
∂Yi
Yi
wi
,
The government’s problem is to choose an optimal tax schedule, optimal private
donations from each type of individuals and the optimal level of public provided
goods to maximize social welfare. To achieve this goal, I will build up the model by
using incentive compatibility approach inspiring from Stiglitz (1982). Assume that
type 2 is the more able and type 1 is the less able. The objective for the government
is to maximize the utility of individuals of type 2, subject to (i) individuals of type
1 having at least a given level of utility; (ii) incentive compatibility constraints; (iii)
raising a given amount of revenue (government expenditure constraint); and (iv) the
privately provided public good constraint. It does this by offering two {c, g,H, Y }
packages4, one of which will be chosen by the more able and the other of which will
4If the government can give (non-linear) tax credits or deductions for charitable contributions
by imposing a non-linear income tax, then the government can effectively choose the contribution
rates.
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be chosen by the less able.
The government
max
{c1,c2,g1,g2,G,H,Y1,Y2}
V 2(c2, g2, G,H, Y2) (3.2.0.8)
s.t V 1(c1, g1, G,H, Y1) = U¯1 (3.2.0.9)
V 2(c2, g2, G,H, Y2) =V 2(c1, g1, G,H, Y1) (3.2.0.10)
V 1(c1, g1, G,H, Y1) =V 1(c2, g2, G,H, Y2) (3.2.0.11)
N1(Y1 − c1 − g1) +N2(Y2 − c2 − g2) =pH (3.2.0.12)
N1g1 +N2g2 = pG (3.2.0.13)
gi > 0 for all i.
where Ni is the number of individuals of type i, p is the cost per unit of the public
good by normalizing the price of one unit of private good to 1.
Equation 3.2.0.10 and 3.2.0.11 are the incentive compatibility constraints5, a
more able individual cannot be better off by choosing the same private consumption,
private donation and to earn the same income as a less able individual, and vice versa.
The general issue of tax assessment of different people might be described as follows.
There are an extensive number of individuals in any economy who are distinct in
terms of a variety of characteristics, specifically their earning power, wealth, and
5Stiglitz (1982) referred them as the self-selection constraints. To see a detailed discussion
about self-selection constraint, see Stiglitz (1982).
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preferences. Different individuals with different characteristics ought to pay different
amount of taxes. However, the government could not observe those characteristics
costlessly and directly. It is consequently has come to be known as the “screening
problem”.
The incentive compatibility constraint typically applies to a situation in which
one agent attempts to differentiate among a set of other agents on the basis of his
observed information. In this case, the government wants to differentiate individuals
into two groups: high ability and low ability. But the information of ability is under
control of the individual, notably a high ability individual would, in general, have
an incentive to be misleading by pretending to be a less able individual to evade
tax payment and other obligations. By using the incentive compatibility constraint
mechanism, the government confronts individuals with two sets of combinations of
choices, and individuals with different abilities would make different selections from
the two sets. Their choices, therefore, reveal information about their characteristics
to the government. In particular, government wants to seek an optimal combination
of tax schedule, private donation and aggregate level of public and private provision
to public good, which leads the more able individual to reveal that they are more
able by earning higher income rather than pretending to be less able and enjoying
more leisure, contributing less public good and finally paying less taxes. In other
words, the tax structure and optimal public good provision policy must be designed
in such a way that the high ability individuals are willing to disclose their ability by
earning higher income.
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The Lagrangian for the government maximization problem can be written as
L =V 2(c2, g2, G,H, Y2) + µV 1(c1, g1, G,H, Y1)
+ λ2
[
V 2(c2, g2, G,H, Y2)− V 2(c1, g1, G,H, Y1)
]
+ λ1
[
V 1(c1, g1, G,H, Y1)− V 1(c2, g2, G,H, Y2)
]
+ γ[N1(Y1 − c1 − g1) +N2(Y2 − c2 − g2)− pH]
+ β(N1g1 +N2g2 − pG).
(3.2.0.14)
I will focus on the normal case where λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0, that is, only high ability type
have the incentive to mimic the low ability type. Define Vˆ 2 = V 2(c1, g1, G,H, Y1),
that is the utility level a more able individual gets when mimicking a less able
individual. Consider the non-linear optimal income tax problem, the first order
conditions for ci and Yi are
∂L
∂c1
= µ
∂V 1
∂c1
− λ2∂Vˆ
2
∂c1
− γN1 = 0, (3.2.0.15)
∂L
∂Y1
= µ
∂V 1
∂Y1
− λ2∂Vˆ
2
∂Y1
+ γN1 = 0, (3.2.0.16)
∂L
∂c2
= (1 + λ2)
∂V 2
∂c2
− γN2 = 0, (3.2.0.17)
∂L
∂Y2
= (1 + λ2)
∂V 2
∂Y2
+ γN2 = 0. (3.2.0.18)
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Dividing 3.2.0.18 by 3.2.0.17 yields
− ∂V
2/∂Y2
∂V 2/∂c2
= 1, (3.2.0.19)
Similarly, dividing 3.2.0.16 by 3.2.0.15 yields
− ∂V
1/∂Y1
∂V 1/∂c1
=
1− λ2(∂Vˆ 2/∂Y1)/N1γ
1 + λ2(∂Vˆ 2/∂c1)/N1γ
< 1. (3.2.0.20)
Those two equations provide the famous results of the optimal income tax schedule
in Stiglitz (1982). The marginal tax rate faced by high ability individuals is zero,
whereas the marginal tax rate faced by low ability individuals is between 0 and
100%. However, those results are not my primary interest in the current analysis.
The current chapter builds on the insights of these results and develops a basic theory
of optimal public good from both public and private sectors when optimal non-linear
income tax is in place.
3.3 The Public Goods Decision Rule
To determine the decision rule for public goods, differentiate the Lagrangian with
respect to the aggregate level of private provision G, the government provided pub-
lic good H, the private contribution from less able individual g1 and the private
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contribution from a more able individual g2. The first order conditions are
∂L
∂H
= (1 + λ2)
∂V 2
∂H
+ µ
∂V 1
∂H
− λ2∂Vˆ
2
∂H
− γp = 0, (3.3.0.1)
∂L
∂G
= (1 + λ2)
∂V 2
∂G
+ µ
∂V 1
∂G
− λ2∂Vˆ
2
∂G
− βp = 0, (3.3.0.2)
∂L
∂g1
= µ
∂V 1
∂g1
− λ2∂Vˆ
2
∂g1
+ (β − γ)N1 = 0, (3.3.0.3)
∂L
∂g2
= (1 + λ2)
∂V 2
∂g2
+ (β − γ)N2 = 0. (3.3.0.4)
From 3.3.0.1, 3.2.0.15 and 3.2.0.17, we can get
1
γ
∂L
∂H
=
(
N1
V 1H
V 1c
+N2
V 2H
V 2c
− p
)
+
λ2Vˆ 2c
γ
[
V 1H
V 1c
− Vˆ
2
H
Vˆ 2c
]
= 0. (3.3.0.5)
Solving 3.3.0.5 yields
N1
V 1H
V 1c
+N2
V 2H
V 2c
= p+
λ2Vˆ 2c
γ
[
Vˆ 2H
Vˆ 2c
− V
1
H
V 1c
]
. (3.3.0.6)
The left-hand side of equation 3.3.0.6 is the sum of marginal rate of substitution be-
tween the public sector provision and the private consumption over all individuals.
Define ˆMRS2Hc = Vˆ
2
H/Vˆ
2
c as the marginal rate of substitution between the govern-
ment funded public good and the private consumption for a mimicker. Then 3.3.0.6
can be rewritten as
∑
MRSiHc = p+
λ2Vˆ 2c
γ
[
ˆMRS2Hc−MRS1Hc
]
. (3.3.0.7)
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Therefore, the deviation from the Samuelson Rule for the public sector provision of
public good in the presence of optimal income taxation depends on the difference
between the marginal rate of substitution of the mimicker and that of low ability
individual. This result is consistent with the two-step model used by Boadway and
Keen (1993). The central difference between Boadway and Keen’s model and the one
presented here is that the present analysis allows for the public good from the private
sector as well as from the public sector. That is to say, individuals are allowed to make
a private contribution to the public good in addition to government-funded public
good. Within the structure of the current model, individual’s voluntary contribution
interacts with other decisions in the utility function and plays an important element
in the optimal tax policy.
By the same manner, we can get the sum of marginal rate of substitution between
the private provision of public good G and the private consumption good ci over all
individuals by solving equation 3.3.0.2.
∑
MRSiGc =
β
γ
p+
λ2Vˆ 2c
γ
[
ˆMRS2Gc−MRS1Gc
]
. (3.3.0.8)
The deviation from Samuelson Rule for private sector provision of public good de-
pends upon the Lagrangian multiplier β, γ and also the difference between the
marginal rate of substitution of a high ability mimicker and that of a low ability
individual.
38
3.3.1 Without Warm Glow of Giving
Now first assume the marginal utility of contribution, ∂U i/∂gi is zero, that is, there
exists no warm glow. The expression of warm glow measures the increase in a person’s
utility from more contribution, holding constant his consumption ci and the total
level of private provision of public good G. In other words, people will gain utility
not only from the increase of aggregate supply of public good but also from their act
of giving. The idea of the warm glow was first captured by Andreoni (1989), who
believes that charitable contributions are impure altruistic and contributors could
get utility from giving. For example, people at a workplace want good reputation
among their colleagues in order to get promoted, they might be liberal in giving
when their company raises charity.
In this subsection, I assume away warm glow, that is, ∂U i/∂gi = 0. Equation
3.3.0.3 and 3.3.0.4 imply that β = γ. The modified Samuelson Rule for private
provision with optimal non-linear income taxation in place becomes
∑
MRSiGc = p+
λ2Vˆ 2c
γ
[
ˆMRS2Gc−MRS1Gc
]
. (3.3.1.1)
That’s also what equation 3.3.0.1 and 3.3.0.2 imply if the publicly provided public
good H and the privately provided public good G are perfect substitutes. If those
two goods were perfect substitutes, then one of modified Samuelson conditions is
redundant. The government could do without private provision or without public
provision.
However, when public provision and private provision are imperfect substitutes,
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β = γ suggests that they each have a modified Samuelson Rule, the first-order con-
ditions are exactly the same as if the government provided both the public provision
H and the charitable donation G directly, funding them by general tax revenue.
3.3.2 Warm Glow of Giving
Consider the following case where individual does gain utility from the act of giving,
that is, ∂U i/∂gi > 0. Recall one of the first order conditions 3.3.0.4
(1 + λ2)
∂V 2
∂g2
+ (β − γ)N2 = 0,
We can immediately deduce γ > β, since the Lagrangian multiplier is positive and
the marginal utility from donation is also positive because of the existence of a warm
glow of giving. Comparing the sum of marginal rates of substitution for privately
provided public good with government funded public good when they are perfect
substitutes, we have:
∑
MRSiGc =
β
γ
p+
λ2Vˆ 2c
γ
[
ˆMRS2Gc−MRS1Gc
]
<
∑
MRSiHc. (3.3.2.1)
The sum of marginal rates of substitution for privately provided public goods is
lower than that of publicly provided public good. Using the property of diminishing
marginal rates of substitution, the privately provided public good, as opposed to
the public provision, would rise. In the case where individuals gain warm glow of
giving, we would have a higher weighted sum of MRS for public provision than for
private provision. This proposes an increase in private provision, relative to public
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provision since each person’s marginal rate of substitution is a decreasing function of
the quantity of the public good. When government provided public good and private
provision are perfect substitutes, with the presence of optimal income tax schedule,
optimal private provision will have a higher level of provision than optimal public
provision with a warm glow of giving.
If there is any warm glow at all, if public provision of public good and private
provision of public good are perfect substitutes, the optimum would have zero gov-
ernment financed public good. This can be intuitively interpreted as funding public
provision from taxes does not give anyone a warm glow, whereas funding private
donation from contributions does yield a warm glow. Thus there is no need to fi-
nance public good by taxes if people feel better from contributing (when the private
donation of public good and public provided public good are perfect substitutes). In
particular, private charitable giving is a more efficient method of providing public
good than direct government expenditure with warm glow of giving. This result can
be characterized as the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the presence of optimal income tax schedule, if public provision of
public good and private provision of public good are perfect substitutes, then private
provision dominates public provision with warm glow of giving (i.e.,
∑
MRSiGc <∑
MRSiHc).
This proposition here reaches a consensus with Saez (2004) that, in spite of the
fact that we approach toward a similar issue by a different manner, when individ-
uals get pleasure from charitable giving, it is more productive to induce people to
contribute as opposed to having government direct spending on public good. But,
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Saez (2004) and Diamond (2006) both pointed out that the idea of warm-glow of
giving might be problematic for the design of non-linear tax model since individuals
obviously know the social planner intentionally controls their contribution. Diamond
argues that warm glow is a measurement in view of the process of deciding the fi-
nal resource allocation; if one cannot keep track of every single process of resource
uses, it might be more efficient to only pay attention to the final resource allocation.
Whether warm glow of giving should be included in social welfare function is still
controversial. It is advanced in describing individual behaviour but at the same time
raises difficulties in modelling social welfare. However, this chapter here does not
explore such modelling issue.
3.4 Some Special Utility Forms
The above section discussed the general form of preference for individuals. It is also
of value to take into account some special cases in which individuals’ preferences are
confined. In this section, I will consider some utility forms that have received a great
deal of attention in the past literature.
3.4.1 Separability
If individual’s utility is separable in leisure, the utility function for individual of type
i can be written as
U i(F [ci, gi, G,H], Li), (3.4.1.1)
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In this case, the private consumption ci, the private donation gi, the aggregate
level of private provision G and the aggregate level of public provision H are weakly
separable from the labour supply Li. And the sub-utility function F [ci, gi, G,H] are
homogeneous across individuals. Weak separability6 is a necessary and sufficient
condition for ∂U i/∂G = ∂Uˆ i/∂G and ∂U i/∂H = ∂Uˆ i/∂H.
When there is no warm glow of giving, we know that β = γ. With the restriction
that public provision and private provision are weakly separable from labour supply,
our modified Samuelson conditions become
∑
MRSiHc = p =
∑
MRSiGc. (3.4.1.2)
Those are exactly the original Samuelson conditions for public good provision,
that is, the sum of marginal rate of substitution over all individual equals marginal
rate of transformation between the public good and a chosen private good. This
suggests that, in the presence of optimal income taxation, if the utility function has
the property that the consumption good is weakly separable from labour supply,
then the Samuelson Rule applies to both public provision and private provision of
the public good. Again, as I discussed in section 3.3.1, if public provision and private
provision are not perfect substitutes, they each have a Samuelson Rule; but if they
are perfect substitutes, then one of the Samuelson Conditions is unnecessary, a social
planner could do without private provision, or without public provision.
With the warm glow of giving, γ > β. The modified Samuelson conditions 3.3.0.7
6Refer to Goldman and Uzawa (1964) and see the proof.
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and 3.3.0.8 become ∑
MRSiHc = p, (3.4.1.3)∑
MRSiGc =
β
γ
p. (3.4.1.4)
The Samuelson Rule applies to the public provision with the warm glow of giving;
however, for the private provision,
∑
MRSiGc < p implies over-provision would be
optimal relative to the Samuelson Rule. The equilibrium would have public provision
equals zero when public provision and private provision are perfect substitutes since
people will not gain utility from forced contribution to the public good through
paying taxes.
3.4.2 Additive Preference
Another special case that other literature discussed intensively is additive consumer
preference. That is, utility is additively separable in the public good. Assume that
all the individuals have the same preference and take the form:
U(ci, gi, G,H, Li) = A(ci, gi, Li) +B(G) +D(H). (3.4.2.1)
This special form yields UHL = 0 and UGL = 0. Take the partial derivative of
marginal rate of substitution between aggregate level of public good and private
consumption with respect to labour supply, we obtain:
∂MRSGci
∂Li
=
UGLiUci − UGUciLi
(Uci)
2
= −UGAciLi
(Uci)
2
, (3.4.2.2)
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∂MRSHci
∂Li
=
UHLiUci − UHUciLi
(Uci)
2
= −UHAciLi
(Uci)
2
. (3.4.2.3)
Thus, with the optimal income tax, the condition for the optimal public goods
provision implicates
∑
MRSiGci(or
∑
MRSiHci) >,=, < p as AciLi >,=, < 0. In
other words, the optimal level of the private provision of public goods (or govern-
ment provision) should be over-provided relative to the Samuelson Rule if consump-
tion good and leisure are complements. To be concrete, for example, suppose private
consumption ci and labour supply Li are substitutes, that is, private provision’s
relative value decreases with increases in labour supply, then the marginal rate of
substitution will be more for a high-ability mimicker than that of a low-ability indi-
vidual. From the modified Samuelson Rule, it immediately follows that the optimal
private provision should be under-provided, even with no warm glow of giving.
3.4.3 Complement or Substitute with Labour Supply
The additive preference discussed above is one of the special cases of this subsection.
In general, assume the two types of individuals have identical preferences, then with
optimal income taxation in place, optimal public goods private provision condition
would involve
∑
MRSiGci >,=, < p as the private provision G is a substitute, a
neutral, or a complement with the labour supply L with no warm glow of giving
(same applies to public provision). That means, for instance, under-provision is
optimal when the private provided public good is a complement with leisure in the
sense that marginal rate of substitution for private provision falls with labour supply.
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Therefore the marginal rate of substitution will be less for the low ability individual,
under-provision will be optimal according to equation 3.3.1.1. In principle,
Proposition 2 The modification of the Samuelson Rule for private provision (or
public provision) of public good depending on whether aggregate charitable donation
(or government funding public good) is a substitute or complement to labour supply
without warm glow of giving; when there exists warm glow, the modification of the
Samuelson Rule for private provision depending on whether warm glow is a substitute
or complement to labour supply with separability in aggregate level of public provision
and aggregate level of private provision.
If the public provision (or the private provision) and leisure are substitutes,
the government in this particular case could weaken the incentive compatibility
constraint by raising the level of public provision (or private provision) above the
Samuelson condition. Since the demand for public good would rise as labour supply
increases, then marginal willingness to pay would be less for the mimicker. The
government could possibly make mimicking less attractive by increasing the level of
public sector (or private sector) provision of the public good, therefore more redis-
tribution could take place.
3.5 Optimal Tax Credit Rule
3.5.1 General Case
In general, the government could potentially encourage a certain pattern of consump-
tion or economic behaviours through exercising tax incentives. For example, in the
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U.S, individuals are permitted to deduct costs of charitable giving from their assess-
able income. In this section, I will discuss the inherent optimal tax incentives rule
from the nature of the design of this income tax structure. The model here is still the
same model discussed in section 3.2 to 3.4. However, this section looks at the shape
of the non-linear tax credit schedule implied by the prior model. If the tax schedule
by each individual is Ti(Yi, gi), which depends on both the person’s income and his
charitable donation. Then he picks ci, Yi and gi to maximize V
i(ci, gi, G,H, Yi) sub-
ject to ci = Yi−gi−T (Yi, gi), taking aggregate supply public good from public sector
as given, and recognizing his impact on the public provided good: pG = p(G−i + gi),
where G−i denotes the sum of everyone else’s contributions and p is the price for the
privately provided public good.
Forming the maximization problem formally, the individual maximizes his utility
subject to his budget constraint
max
{ci,gi,Yi}
V i(ci, gi, G−i + gi, H, Yi)
s.t ci ≤ Yi − pgi − Ti(Yi, gi),
(3.5.1.1)
The first order condition for gi is
∂V i
∂ci
∂ci
∂gi
+
∂V i
∂gi
+
∂V i
∂G
∂G
∂gi
+
∂V i
∂Yi
∂Yi
∂gi
= 0, (3.5.1.2)
Rearranging equation 3.5.1.2 and assuming p = 1 for simplicity, we have
∂Ti
∂gi
=
∂V i/∂gi + ∂V
i/∂G
∂V i/∂ci
− 1. (3.5.1.3)
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Using equation 3.2.0.15, 3.2.0.17, 3.3.0.2, 3.3.0.3 and 3.3.0.4 to get
∂T1
∂g1
=
λ2
[
∂Vˆ 2
∂g1
+
∂Vˆ 2
∂G
− ∂V
2
∂G
− ∂Vˆ
2
∂c1
]
− ∂V
2
∂G
+ β(1−N1)
λ2
∂Vˆ 2
∂c1
+ γN1
, (3.5.1.4)
∂T2
∂g2
=
λ2
∂Vˆ 2
∂G
− µ∂V
1
∂G
+ β(1−N2)
γN2
. (3.5.1.5)
To determine the sign of ∂T2/∂g2, assume utility is separable in aggregate private
provision and as well in the warm glow gi; then from equation 3.3.0.3, γ > β implies
µ > λ2. Therefore, equation 3.5.1.5 tells us ∂T2/∂g2 is negative. That is, if utility is
separable in aggregate public provision and individual’s charitable contribution, the
optimal income tax will decrease as private donation goes up for type 2 (high-income
type). As well, if we assume individual gets higher marginal utility from private
consumption than from private donation7, ∂V i/∂ci > ∂V
i/∂gi, then separability
implies that the right-hand side of equation 3.5.1.4 is also negative.
Those signs for the first order conditions suggest central planner’s policy is in
favour of charitable donation in the optimal taxation schedule. The government,
in fact, encourages individuals in this economy to contribute to the public good by
reducing payment of their tax bill. Both high-ability and less-ability individuals
will receive a positive income tax credit when increasing the private donation to the
7It seems a reasonable assumption that the warm glow of giving a dollar is worth less than a
dollar; otherwise, people would gain from contribution, even if they did not care about the overall
level of private contributions.
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public good. The more private contribution one makes, the more marginal income
tax credit he receives potentially according to the first order conditions.
3.5.2 Large Population
In last section, I assume the price for public good equals 1 for simplicity. And now
take the price for public good as a function of the population for both type 1 and
type 2 individual. Consider
N1 = n1N, (3.5.2.1)
N2 = n2N. (3.5.2.2)
where n1 and n2 are proportions for each type of individuals, 0 ≤ n1 ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ n2 ≤ 1. N is the overall population in this economy.
Assume the price for each unit of public good relates to the population distribu-
tion,
p = (N1 +N2)
α, (3.5.2.3)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. If α = 0, then the public good from private donation is a pure
public good and therefore the price for private provided public good does not vary
with the change of population, so this goes back to the case in subsection 3.5.1 where
p = 1 as fixed. However, if α = 1, then the privately provided public good is a pure
private good, p would rise with the growth of the overall population. Finally, if
0 < α < 1, p would increase as the population grows large.
49
Solving equation 3.5.1.2 with 3.5.2.3 to get
∂Ti
∂gi
=
∂V i/∂gi + ∂V
i/∂G
∂V i/∂ci
− (N1 +N2)α. (3.5.2.4)
Our 3.5.1.4 and 3.5.1.5 become
∂T1
∂g1
=
λ2
[
∂Vˆ 2
∂g1
+
∂Vˆ 2
∂G
− ∂V
2
∂G
− (N1 +N2)α ∂Vˆ
2
∂c1
]
− ∂V
2
∂G
+ β +N1 [γ − β − γ(N1 +N2)α]
λ2
∂Vˆ 2
∂c1
+ γN1
,
(3.5.2.5)
∂T2
∂g2
=
λ2
∂Vˆ 2
∂G
− µ∂V
1
∂G
+ β +N2 [γ − β − γ(N1 +N2)α]
γN2
. (3.5.2.6)
Consider the case when α = 1, that is the extreme case when aggregate private
provision of public good is a pure private good, the marginal tax credit rate for the
high-ability individuals might go towards 100% as the number of people for this group
approaches to infinity. Pure private good has the property of both rivalrousness and
excludability in consumption, meaning consumption of a unit of the good by one
person prevents consumption of that same unit by another person. Also the provider
of this consumption good can control the use of this good. If the private contribution
of public good theoretically has the same feature as pure private good, then the
government’s income tax credit for a high-income individual might approach a dollar
for a dollar if high-ability individuals grow to weight higher percentage of the total
population.
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Part II
Two-stage Non-Cooperative Game
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In Part I, a charitable donation from the private sector are determined by the
government as part of the income tax policy. And from now on, private contribution
is endogenous and whether contributing to the public good is one of the decisions
made by individuals responding to optimal income policy in the economy. It is worth
noting that private contributions in this part is private information held by the in-
dividual, and government cannot either directly control over private contribution or
observe this information separately. Now, suppose the government must offer the
same fixed subsidy rate to everyone for contributions to the privately provided pub-
lic good. If the true price of the privately provided public good is 1, and the subsidy
rate is s, then consequently everyone faces a price 1−s for contributions to the public
good. The price of the publicly provided public good is also assumed to be 1.
Again the government can impose an arbitrary non-linear income tax so that its
goal is to maximize the welfare of one group, subject to the other group attaining
some given utility level, and the “no-mimicking” conditions. However, when the gov-
ernment cannot control directly individuals’ contributions to the privately provided
provided public good, the vectors of people’s chioces for contributions are the Nash
equilibrium for this voluntary contribution game, for example, as in Bergstrom et al.
(1986). In other words, there are two stages for this “voluntary contribution game”.
At the first stage, government imposes a non-linear income tax on the two-group
individuals based on their total income and after-tax income; at the final stage, both
types of individuals maximize their utility based on government’s tax policy and
their own budget constraint in which labour income is allocated between the private
consumption and the public good contribution.
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3.6 Contributing Stage
Suppose that each type of individuals can decide upon a quantity to contribute to the
public good, (g∗1, g
∗
2). The pair of g
∗
1 and g
∗
2 is the Nash equilibrium to the following
N1 + N2 - player game, where Ni is the number of people for type i. A type 1
individual chooses g1 so as to maximize his utility function
V 1(c1, g1, G
∗
−1 + g1, H, Y1), (3.6.0.1)
subject to
c1 = x1 − (1− s)g1, (3.6.0.2)
where
G∗−1 ≡ (N1 − 1)g∗1 +N2g2, g1 = 0. (3.6.0.3)
A type 2 individual chooses g2 so as to maximize his utility function
V 2(c2, g2, G
∗
−2 + g2, H, Y2), (3.6.0.4)
subject to
c2 = x2 − (1− s)g2, (3.6.0.5)
where
G∗−2 ≡ N1g1 + (N2 − 1)g∗2, g2 = 0. (3.6.0.6)
Here x1 and x2 are the net-of-tax income for type 1 and type 2 individual respectively.
When the government cannot personalize subsidies for contributions to the privately
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provided public good, the non-linear income tax must be based on people’s before-
tax income Yi and their total after-tax income xi; however, not on how that after-tax
income is split between ci and gi.
The first order condition for the contribution choice problem for type-i individual
is
(1− s)∂V
i
∂ci
=
∂V i
∂gi
+
∂V i
∂G
i = 1, 2. (3.6.0.7)
Here I assume that the warm glow, which is the first term on the right side of the
equation above, depends on the total contribution of the person, not his contribu-
tion minus the subsidy he gets. As in Bergstrom et al. (1986), there is a Nash
equilibrium to the above game, that is, solving the gifts g∗1 and g
∗
2 as functions of
(x1, x2, Y1, Y2, s,H).
Assume that the government can not detect individuals’ total contributions nor
can base transfers on this total. That means if type 2 person chooses to mimic a
type 1 person, he does not need to contribute the same amount g∗1 to the privately
provided public goods. He just has to pick a gross/net income combination (Y1, x1)
in order to pay for the income tax.
So if a person of type 2 were to choose to mimic, the amount he would want
to contribute to the privately provided public good would be g˜1, the maximization
problem for a mimicker is
V 2(c˜1, g˜1, G+ g˜1 − g2, H, Y1), (3.6.0.8)
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subject to
c˜1 = x1 − (1− s)g˜1, (3.6.0.9)
where
G˜ ≡ G+ g˜1 − g∗2, g˜1 = 0. (3.6.0.10)
Define c˜1 = x1 − (1− s)g˜1, G˜ = G+ g˜1 − g∗2. They are the private consumption and
the aggregate private contribution of mimicker respectively.
3.7 Setting the Non-linear Income Taxation
Now the government’s problem is the usual non-linear income tax problem, which
can be written as the maximization of
V 2(x2 − (1− s)g∗2, g∗2, G,H, Y2), (3.7.0.1)
subject to
V 1(x1 − (1− s)g∗1, g∗1, G,H, Y1) ≥ U¯1, (3.7.0.2)
V 2(x2− (1− s)g∗2, g∗2, G,H, Y2) ≥ V 2(x1− (1− s)g˜1, g˜1, G+ g˜1− g∗2, H, Y1), (3.7.0.3)
V 1(x1− (1− s)g∗1, g∗1, G,H, Y1) ≥ V 2(x2− (1− s)g˜2, g˜2, G+ g˜2− g∗2, H, Y2), (3.7.0.4)
N1(Y1 − x1 − sg∗1) +N2(Y2 − x2 − sg∗2) ≥ H. (3.7.0.5)
One different setting in this game compared with the conventional optimal income
tax problem is that when a person maximize his utility function, he realizes that
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if he chooses to mimic, then he will also change his private contribution which will
change the total contributions by g˜j − g∗i . At the same time, this person is ignoring
the fact that the g∗i ’s and g
∗
j ’s are the Nash equilibrium to the two-stage game, which
would actually change if he mimicked.
The government’s choice variables in this tax-setting constrained optimization are
(x1, x2, Y1, Y2, s,H) with the G
∗
i ’s and g˜i’s depending on those variables, but not being
direct control variables for the government.
A full examination would, obviously, start with the general Lagrangian form
and inspect its properties. The trouble with such a broad approach is that it does
not prompt any basic solutions at any rate. In this section, I first present the
first order conditions with general functional forms. Since analytic formulae for
the optimal income tax schedule seem impossible, I then make several innocuous
restrictions for individual’s preference in the following section in order to find some
clear implications.
L =V 2(x2 − (1− s)g∗2, g∗2, G,H, Y2) + µV 1(x1 − (1− s)g∗1, g∗1, G,H, Y1)
+ λ2
[
V 2(x2 − (1− s)g∗2, g∗2, G,H, Y2)− V 2(x1 − (1− s)g˜1, g˜1, G+ g˜1 − g∗2, H, Y1)
]
+ γ [N1 (Y1 − x1 − sg∗1) +N2 (Y2 − x2 − sg∗2)−H] . (3.7.0.6)
Consider the optimal income tax problem, the first order conditions for xi, Yi are
∂L
∂x1
= (1 + λ2)
[
−(1− s)V 2c2
∂g∗2
∂x1
+ V 2g∗2
∂g∗2
∂x1
+ V 2G
∂G
∂x1
]
+ µ
[
V 1c1
(
1− (1− s)∂g
∗
1
∂x1
)
+ V 1g∗1
∂g∗1
∂x1
+ V 1G
∂G
∂x1
]
− λ2
[
V 2c˜1
(
1− (1− s) ∂g˜1
∂x1
)
+ V 2g˜1
∂g˜1
∂x1
+ V 2
G˜
(
∂G
∂x1
+
∂g˜1
∂x1
− ∂g
∗
2
∂x1
)]
− γ
[
N1
(
1 + s
∂g∗1
∂x1
)
+N2s
∂g∗2
∂x1
]
, (3.7.0.7)
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∂L
∂Y1
= (1 + λ2)
[
−(1− s)V 2c2
∂g∗2
∂Y1
+ V 2g∗2
∂g∗2
∂Y1
+ V 2G
∂G
∂Y1
]
+ µ
[
−(1− s)V 1c1
∂g∗1
∂Y1
+ V 1g∗1
∂g∗1
∂Y1
+ V 1G
∂G
∂Y1
+ V 1Y1
]
− λ2
[
−(1− s)V 2c˜1
∂g˜1
∂Y1
+ V 2g˜1
∂g˜1
∂Y1
+ V 2
G˜
(
∂G
∂Y1
+
∂g˜1
∂Y1
− ∂g
∗
2
∂Y1
)
+ V 2Y1
]
+ γ
[
N1
(
1− s ∂g
∗
1
∂Y1
)
−N2s ∂g
∗
2
∂Y1
]
,
(3.7.0.8)
∂L
∂x2
= (1 + λ2)
[
V 2c2
(
1− (1− s) ∂g
∗
2
∂x2
)
+ V 2g∗2
∂g∗2
∂x2
+ V 2G
∂G
∂x2
]
+ µ
[
−(1− s)V 1c1
∂g∗1
∂x2
+ V 1g∗1
∂g∗1
∂x2
+ V 1G
∂G
∂x2
]
− λ2
[
−(1− s)V 2c˜1
∂g˜1
∂x2
+ V 2g˜1
∂g˜1
∂x2
+ V 2
G˜
(
∂G
∂x2
+
∂g˜1
∂x2
− ∂g
∗
2
∂x2
)]
− γ
[
N1s
∂g∗1
∂x2
+N2
(
1 + s
∂g∗2
∂x2
)]
, (3.7.0.9)
∂L
∂Y2
= (1 + λ2)
[
−(1− s)V 2c2
∂g∗2
∂Y2
+ V 2g∗2
∂g∗2
∂Y2
+ V 2G
∂G
∂Y2
+ V 2Y2
]
+ µ
[
−(1− s)V 1c1
∂g∗1
∂Y2
+ V 1g∗1
∂g∗1
∂Y2
+ V 1G
∂G
∂Y2
]
− λ2
[
−(1− s)V 2c˜1
∂g˜1
∂Y2
+ V 2g˜1
∂g˜1
∂Y2
+ V 2
G˜
(
∂G
∂Y2
+
∂g˜1
∂Y2
− ∂g
∗
2
∂Y2
)]
+ γ
[
−N1s ∂g
∗
1
∂Y2
+N2
(
1− s ∂g
∗
2
∂Y2
)]
. (3.7.0.10)
3.8 Identical Preferences
Some results are possible to establish, however if the utility function is separable in
labour supply. Assume people have identical tastes, and there is no warm glow of
giving. Consider the privately provided public good as a normal good. In order to
simplify this analysis, I assign individual’s utility as the following form:
Vi = u(ci, G) + h(H) + fi(Yi), (3.8.0.1)
where fi = f(
Yi
wi
). This utility function has the property that utility is additively
separable in the government funded public good and labour supply.
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Forming Lagrangian
L =u(x2 − (1− s)g∗2 , G) + h(H) + f2(Y2) + µ [u(x1 − (1− s)g∗1 , G) + h(H) + f1(Y1)]
+ λ2 [u(x2 − (1− s)g∗2 , G) + f2(Y2)− u(x1 − (1− s)g˜1, G+ g˜1 − g∗2)− f2(Y1)]
+ γ [N1(Y1 − x1 − sg∗1) +N2(Y2 − x2 − sg∗2)−H] , (3.8.0.2)
The first order conditions are
∂L
∂x1
=− (1 + λ2)(1− s)uc2
∂g∗2
∂x1
+ (1 + µ+ λ2)uG
∂G
∂x1
+ µuc1
(
1− (1− s) ∂g
∗
1
∂x1
)
− λ2uc˜1
(
1− (1− s) ∂g˜1
∂x1
)
− λ2uG˜
(
∂G
∂x1
+
∂g˜1
∂x1
− ∂g
∗
2
∂x1
)
− γ
[
N1
(
1 + s
∂g∗1
∂x1
)
+N2s
∂g∗2
∂x1
]
= 0, (3.8.0.3)
∂L
∂Y1
=− (1 + λ2)(1− s)uc2
∂g∗2
∂Y1
+ (1 + µ+ λ2)uG
∂G
∂Y1
− µuc1 (1− s)
∂g∗1
∂Y1
+ µ
∂f1(Y1)
∂Y1
+ λ2(1− s)uc˜1
∂g˜1
∂Y1
− λ2uG˜
(
∂G
∂Y1
+
∂g˜1
∂Y1
− ∂g
∗
2
∂Y1
)
− λ2 ∂f2(Y1)
∂Y1
+ γ
[
N1
(
1− s ∂g
∗
1
∂Y1
)
−N2s ∂g
∗
2
∂Y1
]
= 0, (3.8.0.4)
∂L
∂x2
=(1 + λ2)uc2
(
1− (1− s)∂g
∗
2
∂x2
)
+ (1 + µ+ λ2)uG
∂G
∂x2
− µuc1 (1− s)
∂g∗1
∂x2
+ λ2uc˜1 (1− s)
∂g˜1
∂x2
− λ2uG˜
(
∂G
∂x2
+
∂g˜1
∂x2
− ∂g
∗
2
∂x2
)
− γ
[
N1s
∂g∗1
∂x2
+N2
(
1 + s
∂g∗2
∂x2
)]
= 0, (3.8.0.5)
∂L
∂Y2
=− (1 + λ2)(1− s)uc2
∂g∗2
∂Y2
+ (1 + µ+ λ2)uG
∂G
∂Y2
− µuc1 (1− s)
∂g∗1
∂Y2
+ (1 + λ2)
∂f2(Y2)
∂Y2
+ λ2(1− s)uc˜1
∂g˜1
∂Y2
− λ2uG˜
(
∂G
∂Y2
+
∂g˜1
∂Y2
− ∂g
∗
2
∂Y2
)
+ γ
[
−N1s ∂g
∗
1
∂Y2
+N2
(
1− s ∂g
∗
2
∂Y2
)]
= 0, (3.8.0.6)
Each individual’s contribution is “a best response” to the other’s given the govern-
ment’s income tax policy. A Nash equilibrium would be a stable state that once the
contribution decisions are made by the two-type individuals, neither has cause to
changing his own contribution upon learning the other’s.
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3.9 Equilibrium at the Contributing Stage
There are two possible equilibria with this two stage non-cooperative game. There
exists a minimum critical level of net-of-tax income x∗1. If low ability type of individ-
ual’s income is below this level, then the Nash equilibrium has only high ability type
of individual contributing: g1 = 0, g2 = G/N2; and in this case, the high ability in-
dividual has higher private consumption than that of low ability individual, c2 > c1.
However, if type 1 (low earner)’ income is above the critical level, then everyone in
the economy chooses to contribute in equilibrium, that is, g1 > 0, g2 > 0. Since the
consumers’ utility has the character of separability, so that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between the privately provided public good G and the private consumption
ci is independent of the labour supply. The Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian neutrality
result occurs if both types choose to contribute in equilibrium. The first-order con-
dition for the choice of contribution is
∑
MRSci,G = 1−s, that is, the marginal rate
of substitution between the private consumption and the privately provided public
good equals the net price of the contribution. Since everyone consumes the same
private provision of public good G, they must have the same private consumption
ci. Therefore, when both types of individuals’ income are above the critical level,
everyone consumes the same private consumption, c1 = c2 and the aggregate level of
private provision of public good G.
First, consider the case where type 1 individual’s income is above the critical level,
that is, c1 = c2. Since everyone is getting the same private provision G, according to
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the resource constraint
N1x1 +N2x2 = pG+N1c1 +N2c2 (3.9.0.1)
then they all must have the same after-tax income xi when the marginal rate of
substitution for private provision is a monotonically increasing function of the after-
tax income.8
In this case, we have c1 = c2, x1 = x2; with uniform subsidy rate, g1 = g2. The
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian neutrality result carries over in this special case. An
income redistribution will change a consumer’s donation by precisely the amount of
change in his income. In the new Nash equilibrium, each type of consumer has the
same private consumption and privately public good provision with that of before-
redistribution. We have
uc1 = uc2 ;
∂g1
∂x1
=
∂g2
∂x2
= 1;
∂g1
∂x2
=
∂g2
∂x1
= −1.
Type 2 person would have more incentive to mimic type 1 person since the in-
centive compatibility constraint in section 3.2 implies that:
V 2 = u(c2, G) + h(H) + f2(Y2),
Vˆ 2 = u(c1, G) + h(H) + f2(Y1).
8The private provision of public good is a normal good.
60
where Vˆ 2 is the utility type 2 person gets when mimicking type 1 person. Each type
consumes the same private consumption good and the same amount of aggregate
private contribution to public good. Type 2 person can supply less labour working
hours by mimicking type 1 person and can still obtain the same private consumption
and public good consumption. There would be no incentive for the mimicker to
supply more working hours and type 2 would be made worse off by earning a higher
income. However, since individuals have identical preferences, in order to pretend to
be a low ability individual, the mimicker has to earn the same income as a low ability
individual and get the same net-of-tax income x1, therefore g˜1 = g1 = g2, G˜ = G.
The result given here are in a rather different form, if the no-mimicking constraint
is not satisfied, then there is no solution to the first stage optimal tax problem when
both types of individuals choose to contribute at the equilibrium. When net-of-tax
income for both types of individuals is above the critical value, we could not find the
optimal non-linear income tax for government’ welfare maximization problem.
Proposition 3 The Nash equilibrium for this two-stage non-cooperative game is that
only high-income earner would make positive voluntary contribution to the public
good, g1 = 0 and g2 = G/N2.
The equilibrium for this game presented in this chapter agrees on the optimum for
subsidized private provision with two types of worker setting in Diamond (2006).
Diamond also comes to conclude that in an economy where there are only two types
of workers, the optimum will have only the higher type contributing whether incentive
compatibility constraint binds or not. In fact, the equilibrium that only high skill
workers would contribute to the public good holds regardless both types of individuals
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receive a uniform subsidy or different subsidizing rates with different earning levels.
As long as the incentive compatibility continues to bind, the equilibrium for this
economy always has the optimum allocation in which low income earners contribute
nothing at all whereas high income earners are willing to make a positive amount of
donation to the private provision of public good. I show in section 3.11 that welfare
is always improving with a positive subsidy.
3.10 Optimal Tax Rates at the First Stage
However, the only equilibrium that would have a solution for the first stage is when
low-ability workers’ income is below the critical value. If income differences are large
enough, then the low-ability workers will choose not to contribute and only high-
ability workers contribute to private donation: g1 = 0, g2 = G/N2. High-ability
workers are paid enough more to finance both consumption and donation, so they
could consume higher private consumption and at the same time make a positive
donation to the privately provided public good, c2 > c1. With only high ability
individual contributing,
c1 = c˜1 = x1 = x˜1, (1− s)uc2 = uG, g˜1 = g1 = 0,
∂g∗1
∂xi
=
∂g∗1
∂Yi
= 0.
Consider equalizing wealth from contributors to non-contributors. According to
Theorem 5 in Bergstrom et al. (1986), the supply of the public good at the equilibrium
will decrease after a wealth redistribution from contributors to non-contributors.
Therefore, aggregate private donation from high ability workers, G will decrease and
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so does g∗2. The first order conditions for xi and Yi in section 3.8 are reduced to:
∂L
∂x1
= (µ− λ2)uc1 + (1− s)(µN2 +N2 − 1)uc2
∂g∗2
∂x1
− γ
(
N1 +N2s
∂g∗2
∂x1
)
= 0, (3.10.0.1)
∂L
∂Y1
= µ
∂f1(Y1)
∂Y1
− λ2 ∂f2(Y1)
∂Y1
+ (1− s)(µN2 +N2 − 1)uc2
∂g∗2
∂Y1
+ γ
(
N1 −N2s∂g
∗
2
∂Y1
)
= 0,
(3.10.0.2)
∂L
∂x2
= (1 + λ2)uc2 + (1− s)(µN2 +N2 − 1)uc2
∂g∗2
∂x2
− γN2
(
1 + s
∂g∗2
∂x2
)
= 0, (3.10.0.3)
∂L
∂Y2
= (1 + λ2)
∂f2(Y2)
∂Y2
+ (1− s)(µN2 +N2 − 1)uc2
∂g∗2
∂Y2
+ γN2
(
1− s∂g
∗
2
∂Y2
)
= 0. (3.10.0.4)
Dividing 3.10.0.4 by 3.10.0.3 and dividing 3.10.0.2 by 3.10.0.1,
−∂V
2/∂Y2
∂V 2/∂c2
= −∂f2(Y2)/∂Y2
uc2
=
γN2 − ∂g
∗
2
∂Y2
[γN2s− (µN2 +N2 − 1)uG]
γN2 +
∂g∗2
∂x2
[γN2s− (µN2 +N2 − 1)uG]
, (3.10.0.5)
−∂V
1/∂Y1
∂V 1/∂c1
=
∂f1(Y1)/∂Y1
uc1
=
(1− λ2
µ
)
(
γN1 − ∂g
∗
2
∂Y1
[γN2s− (µN2 +N2 − 1)uG]− λ2 ∂f2(Y1)
∂Y1
)
(
γN1 +
∂g∗2
∂x1
[γN2s− (µN2 +N2 − 1)uG]
) .
(3.10.0.6)
Since I assume at the beginning, workers will get disutility from work, that is,
∂V i
∂Yi
=
∂U i
∂Li
1
w
< 0. An increase in the total income lowers utility, because to earn it the
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individual must sacrifice more leisure. Therefore,
−(1 + λ2)∂f2(Y2)
∂Y2
= γN2 − ∂g
∗
2
∂Y2
[γN2s− (µN2 +N2 − 1)uG] > 0, (3.10.0.7)
(1 + λ2)uc2 = γN2 +
∂g∗2
∂x2
[γN2s− (µN2 +N2 − 1)uG] > 0, (3.10.0.8)
−∂f1(Y1)
∂Y1
=
γN1 − ∂g
∗
2
∂Y1
[γN2s− (µN2 +N2 − 1)uG]− λ2∂f2(Y1)
∂Y1
µ
> 0,
(3.10.0.9)
uc1 =
γN1 +
∂g∗2
∂x1
[γN2s− (µN2 +N2 − 1)uG]
µ− λ2 > 0. (3.10.0.10)
Those imply that −∂V
2/∂Y2
∂V 2/∂c2
> 0, −∂V
1/∂Y1
∂V 1/∂c1
> 0. The optimal marginal income
tax rates for high ability workers and low ability workers would be both less than
100%.
3.11 Policy Perturbation
In this section, I give a brief discussion about government intervention for public
good provision. Consider the subsidy rate s and the government funded public good
H are two choice variables at the first stage. The first order conditions of Lagrangian
for s and H are
∂L
∂s
= [(1 + λ2)uc2 − γN2] g∗2 +
∂g∗2
∂s
[(µN2 +N2 − 1)uG − γN2s] = 0 (3.11.0.1)
∂L
∂H
= (1 + µ)
∂h(H)
∂H
− γ + ∂g
∗
2
∂H
[(µN2 +N2 − 1)uG − γN2s] = 0 (3.11.0.2)
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It seems not possible to generate a neat explanation from those two first order con-
ditions and consequently it is hard to evaluate the impact of subsidy rate and public
provision without imposing a number of strong assumptions on people’s decisions of
labour supply and private contributions.
The conventional theory claims that the Nash equilibrium of private contribu-
tion to public good tends to imply under-provision of the public good compared to
Pareto efficient allocations. So to achieve the efficient level of supply for the public
good in an economy, a small subsidy is necessary. Generally, it should always be
the case that the subsidy rate s > 0 at the optimum when only the high income
earners contribute. Consider the following 5-steps welfare exercise: (i) Start with
s = 0, (ii) now increase the subsidy rate a little, and at the same time decrease
the net-of-tax income x2 for the high income earners, so as to keep the government
budget balanced (taking into account the new contribution choices made by the high
income earners in the second stage), (iii) the fact that originally the sum of high
income earners’ MRS were greater than the marginal cost of privately provided good
G means that the high income earners are better off after this policy change, that
is, the result that there is inefficient under provision at the Nash equilibrium with
private contributions, (iv) the low income earners are also better off since they’re
getting more public good from private provision, (v) now, if necessary, increases x2
and decreases x1 so that the no-mimicking constraint still holds. The government
can always do this: if it decreases x1 until the low income earners are exactly as
well off as they were before the policy perturbation, then the government is making
the low income earners strictly better off than they were, (vi) Starting from s = 0,
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steps (i) − (v) show that one can always increase social welfare and still satisfy all
the constraints to the planner’s problem by increasing s above zero. Therefore, the
planner’s optimum must have s > 0. This result shows that private provision would
not generate a Pareto efficient outcome and it would be Pareto-improving for the
high ability type of individuals to increase their contribution towards the private
provision. Such results provide a natural role for the government to participate in
financing the provision of public goods by the income taxation that was analysed in
this chapter.
3.12 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has developed a framework for analysing the non-linear tax treatment
of private provision of public good in an economy where there are only two groups
of individuals. It also examined the Nash equilibrium in a two-stage optimal income
taxation model with voluntary contribution to public good.
Several strong results are obtained from this chapter when individuals are identi-
cal. In the standard optimal income taxation model inspired by Stiglitz (1982), the
private provision of public good is generally more efficient when private provision
and public provision are perfect substitutes with warm glow of giving. Further-
more, I show that the modification of the Samuelson Rule for private provision or
public provision of public good depending on whether aggregate charitable donation
or government funding public good is a substitute or complement to labour supply
without warm glow of giving. Recognizing the endogeneity of charitable giving in
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the two-stage game, my analysis demonstrates the Nash equilibrium would have only
high-ability individuals making positive donation.
This current approach has obvious limitations, but I believe that it is adequate
to show the significance of non-linear tax treatment for charitable giving decision
and the optimal tax credit rates. The present model could be extended in three
directions. First, it would be interesting to infer multiple public goods provision
under the optimal income taxation schedule. Second, a more intensive examination
of an economy of heterogeneous individuals may promote further ramification and
help to explain why tax-funded subsidy sometimes is more efficient than government
direct spending and other times is not. Third, obviously, the basic intuition could be
extended to an economy consisting of more than two types of consumers. Exploring
these issues more profoundly is important to cast additionally light on the disputable
policy issue of public spendings funded by distortionary income tax.
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Tax Incentive on
Charitable Contribution:
Empirical Evidence from Canada
4.1 Introduction
Charitable contribution performs a significant role in providing financial aid to insti-
tutions such as churches, hospitals, religious organization, museums and educational
institutions. Monetary help from the voluntary sector reduces the heavy fiscal bur-
dens of the public sector by sharing the responsibility of providing public goods and
services. Certain tax incentives can lower the cost of charitable giving and provide an
indirect subsidy to eligible taxpayers, therefore promote individuals or corporations
to give to charity. Generally, there are two regimes of income tax incentives that
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reduce the price of charitable giving: the tax deductions regime and the tax credits
regime. Taxpayers can reduce the full amount of gifts from their taxable income
through the income tax deduction. As a result, the price of the charitable giving
is lowered by the proportion of the marginal income tax rate. For instance, in the
United States, individuals can deduct charitable giving from their taxable income
if they choose to itemize when claiming income tax. Canada employs a tax credit
regime in which people that make qualifying gifts can claim a federal and provincial
non-refundable credit against their basic income tax otherwise payable.
As an alternative to indirectly providing fiscal subsidies to charitable donation in
the form of deductions or credits, government can support charitable organizations
in the form of direct matching grants. Since a deduction or credit for charitable
donation are funded by foregone tax revenues, evaluation of whether tax incentives
is a cost-effective method of financing charitable gifts and organizations has become
a research interest for fiscal analysis over the past thirty years. The effectiveness of
tax incentives relies on the effect of changing the tax price on charitable donations.
Economists deem tax incentives will increase the demand of charitable contributions
by decreasing their after-tax cost to the contributor. The higher the credit or deduc-
tion rate (the lower the after-tax price), the donors would be expected to contribute
higher amounts of gifts to charity and therefore providing greater encouragement to
make donations to the charity.
On an economic basis, the characteristic of charitable giving described above sug-
gests it has a negative price elasticity. Price elasticity of the contribution explains
the extent to which a contributor increases the quantity of charitable donation with
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respect to a reduction in its after-tax cost. For example, a price elasticity between
zero and negative one, shows that the tax spending due to tax reduction or credit
exceeds the increase in charitable contribution, suggesting the tax incentive to char-
itable giving is an inefficient way to assist charitable organization.
While there is a large literature examining the price elasticity of charitable do-
nations in the US, limited research has considered the price elasticity of charitable
donations in Canada. In the U.S, the tax preference for charitable giving makes
the price inversely related to the marginal income tax rate, which implies that in-
dividuals with higher income get lower tax price for donations. Hence, most of the
U.S literature focuses on disentangling the effect of tax price on charitable giving
from the income effect. More definite estimates of the price elasticity of charitable
donations and of government crowd-out in Canada would be needed in order to get
a better indication of the price effectiveness of the Charitable Donation Tax Credit,
both on its own and relative to direct government funding (Department of Finance
Canada, 2015). Estimation from prior literature using U.S data may not apply as a
direct guide to Canadian tax policy since the tax incentive structure between those
two countries are different; culture, innate altruism and other societal differences also
lead to different personal reactions to tax incentives as well.
Given that donations have not been studied extensively in Canada, this chapter of
my thesis fills a gap in the past research on Canadian philanthropy and makes use of
the superiority of the survey data. One advantage of the survey data, compared with
the tax filer data, is that it contains affluent information on personal characteristics in
households and therefore could overcomes the omitted variable bias problem result-
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ing from the unobserved characteristics that could be potentially correlated with the
amount of donations or income. This chapter of the thesis analyses the effects of the
change of after-tax price among other characteristics such as socio-demographic and
geographic characteristics, on charitable giving. Specifically, I analyse the behaviour
of Canadians’ response towards the change of tax credits for charitable donation
across provinces and over time, in the interest of assessing the impact that a change
in after-tax price might have on donations. Using the survey of household spending
data, I pool the cross-sectional data for thirteen years, track household expenditure
by different families across the country, and explore whether the two-tiered tax credit
system is cost-effective among different income level taxpayers as well as in different
charitable sectors.
The purpose of this research is to take advantage of the variation in the tax price
of charitable giving both between individuals across provinces and within provinces
over time in Canada to identify the extent to which peoples’ decisions of donations
are influenced by tax credits. To account for the endogeneity of the tax price for
charitable giving, I instrument the tax price of charitable giving for both donations
up to $200 and for donations over $200 using the statutory income tax credit rates.
The results of this chapter suggest that individuals in Canada are quite responsive to
the change of tax incentive for charitable donation since price elasticity found here in
general exceeds 1 in absolute value. However, price elasticity of charitable donations
for middle-income group is much more elastic compared to that of low-income and
high-income group. The price elasticity estimates for charitable donations in this
analysis fall well within the range of traditional estimates in the past literature.
71
The significance of the current analysis is to provide an alternative view to public
sector and legislators in Canada about changes in responses of Canadians towards
changes in tax incentives for charitable giving. As well as contributing to an evalua-
tion of the current Canadian tax credit system for charitable donations, this analysis
also reviews an angle of how to tackle the endogeneity problem of the Canadian
tax price for giving by using the thirteen years survey of household spending for
Canadian families. The recognition of charitable donations influenced by economic,
demographic and geographic factors during taxation year 1997 to 2009 in this finding
may provide recommendation to improve social planner’ strategies to increase the
quantity of donations to charitable organization and of eligible donees in Canada.
There has been plenty of empirical literature on tax incentives on charitable do-
nation with widely varying price elasticities. The earliest work can be traced back to
Taussig (1967). Taussig (1967) used a cross-sectional data from the 1962 Treasury
Tax File and finds the level of private giving will decline about 0.2 to 0.4 percent
in responce to a one percent increase in the price of giving caused by changing the
deductibility of gifts. Later, Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) find the elasticity of char-
itable giving with respect to the price or net cost of giving is slightly greater than one.
In the same year with Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976), Feldstein and Taylor (1976)
use cross-sectional data from the 1962 and 1970 Treasury Tax File. They deem the
price elasticity falls in the range between −1.0 to −1.5. Randolph (1995) challenges
the consensus that prior literature made upon price elasticity and decomposes the
effect of tax price into permanent and transitory by using instrument variables. By
estimating a ten-year panel of tax return data that covers two tax reforms, he sug-
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gests that the permanent price elasticity is −0.51, while transitory price elasticity is
−1.55. Randolph argues that the conventional estimate of price elasticity of chari-
table giving results from a mixture of permanent and transitory variation; however,
for tax policy predictions, it is often the permanent behavioural effects that matter
most (Randolph, 1995). Auten et al. (2002) deal with the same research question as
Randolph. In contrast to the result of Randolph, they estimate the persistent price
elasticity ranges from −0.79 to −1.26 based on a time series analyses of panel data.
Peloza and Steel (2005) examine the price elasticities of donations through a meta-
analytic techniques. Their analysis includes approximately 40 years of estimates of
the price elasticity of charitable giving, mostly from U.S. and Canada and concludes
the variations in tax deductibility indeed appear to have a marked effect on private
donations. Bakija and Heim (2011) use a most recent panel of individual income
tax returns covering the years 1979 to 2006 for the United States, and try to distin-
guish transitory form persistent variation in prices of charitable giving and incomes
by incorporating lagged and future changes in price and income in the specification.
Their instrument estimates suggests a persistent price elasticity is in excess of one
in absolute value. Duquette (2016) identifies a larger effect in magnitude than most
literature using individual tax return data have estimated. His research implies that
the tax elasticity for charitable donation is about -4 by estimating the effect of the
tax deduction on charities’ donation revenue form charities’ tax filings.
Canadian studies also assess the effectiveness of tax policy on charitable giving.
However, among the past Canadian studies, there is still no clear consensus on the
magnitude of price elasticity for charitable giving. There are a couple of studies
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before Canada switched to tax credit system. Hood et al. (1977) is the first empir-
ical study of charitable donations in Canada. By using the ordinary least squares
model, they find income and price all have impact on individuals’ donations. Kitchen
and Dalton (1990) and Kitchen (1992) investigate the determinants of charitable do-
nation by Canadian families under the tax deduction system. These two research
studies suggest that the price of giving is an important determinant of all charita-
ble contributions except for religious organizations. Under the tax credit system,
Hossain and Lamb (2012) focus on evaluating the effectiveness of the tax incentive
variation across donation sectors by using the Canadian Survey of Giving, Volunteer-
ing and Participating. Estimated price elasticities for all sectors in their study are
found elastic, except for the religious sector. Particularly, the estimated price elas-
ticity of total donations is −1.68. The most recent Canadian research on charitable
giving is Hickey et al. (2017). They use the Longitudinal Administrative database
from Canada to estimate the tax price elasticity of donations. The disadvantage of
the data in this paper is that it provides very limited information on respondents’
characteristics. The tax price elasticity of charitable donations found in this article
is −0.6, proposing that Canadians do not respond strongly to changes on the tax
price of donations. However, their identification only focuses on the within-province
changes in the tax credit rates to identify the effect of tax price on donations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews
the history of Canadian income tax incentive for charitable donation and the signif-
icant changes in policy regarding encouraging charitable giving over the last fifteen
years. Section 4.3 describes the survey of household spending data and further elabo-
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rate how I construct the after-tax price for charitable giving. Section 4.4 outlines the
empirical model and identification strategy. In section 4.5, I contrast an alternate
method to indicate marginal tax incentive. And section 4.6 reports the benchmark
estimates and robustness checks. Section 4.7 provides concluding remark.
4.2 Charitable Donation Tax Credits in Canada
4.2.1 Conversion from Tax Deduction to Tax Credit
Canada converted to the two-tier credit regime from tax deduction regime in 1988,
which was the major change in Canadian income tax history in recognition of char-
itable gifts and contribution. Prior to 1988, charitable contributions by individuals
were recognized in the form of a tax deduction, in which the tax benefit from chari-
table giving essentially depends on an individual’s income level. In other words, the
after-tax price of donation is lower for a high-income level individual than for a low-
income level individual. Critics argued that the deduction was a regressive method
of encouraging charitable donation which provided a greater level of encouragement
to charities favoured by high-income donors than low-income donors (Duff, 2001).
Moreover, the regressivity of tax deduction of giving results in greater encourage-
ment to charitable organizations favoured by rich donors than those favoured by poor
donors. Studies demonstrate that high-wage taxpayers have a tendency to commit
a greater extent of gifts to colleges, hospitals, and arts galleries, while low-wage tax-
payers are in favour of supporting religious organizations.
Since 1988, the Canadian government recognizes charitable donations and gifts
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Table 4.1
Charitable Donation Tax Credit Rate1, by Province in Canada, 1997 and 2009
(%)
1997 2009
First $ 200
of Donations
Donation
in Excess
of $ 200
First $ 200
of Donations
Donations
in Excess
of $ 200
Federal 17.00 29.00 15.00 29.00
Newfoundland and Labrador 11.73 20.01 7.70 15.50
Price Edward Island 10.12 17.26 9.80 16.70
Nova Scotia 9.95 16.97 8.79 17.50
New Brunswick 10.71 18.27 9.65 17.95
Que´bec2 23.00 23.00 20.00 24.00
Ontario 8.16 13.92 6.05 11.16
Manitoba 8.50 14.50 10.80 17.40
Saskatchewan 9.40 16.00 11.00 15.00
Alberta 7.74 13.20 10.00 21.00
British Columbia 8.67 14.79 5.06 14.70
1. The credit rate is statutory rate, which is not subject to surtaxes. Surtaxes increase the value of the credit as
they are calculated as a percentage of provincial/territorial income taxes net of the provincial/territorial Charitable
Donation Tax Credit.
2. The tax credit rate for Que´bec residents must be adjusted for a 16.5% Que´bec abatement.
Source: Canada Revenue Agency; Department of Finance Canada calculations.
in the structure of a tax credit, the value of which does not rely on the donor’s
income level. Eligible taxpayers can get a reduction against their taxable income for
annual charitable contribution up to $200 1 and an additional incentive on charitable
contribution exceeding $200 at both the federal level and the provincial level. The
tax credit for charitable giving is generally computed at the lowest personal income
tax rate for the first $200 of donations and the highest personal income tax rate for
1From 2000 to 2005, the cut-off point for higher marginal tax credit in Que´bec is $2000 as
opposed to $200 in any other province. In addition, the credit rate available to Que´bec residents
must be adjusted for the 16.5% Que´bec abatement.
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donations exceeding $200. Some provinces have different rates from the marginal in-
come tax rates at the provincial level, for example, Que´bec has their own tax credit
rate scheme. As a result, the after-tax price of one dollar of charitable giving is
roughly 75 cents for donations up to $200 and 50 cents for donations above $200.
For the year 2003, for instance, Canadian taxpayers can take a federal tax credit of
16% for the first $200 donated to charities and 29% for the amount beyond the first
$200. Taxpayers residing in Ontario can take a provincial tax credit of 6.05% for the
first $200 donation and 11.16% for donations above $200. Therefore, the combined
federal and provincial credit rates for donors resided in Ontario for the tax year 2003
are 22.05% for donation up to $200 and 40.16% for donation more than $200, bring-
ing the after-tax price for donation of $1 to approximately $0.78 for donation up to
$200 and $0.6 for donation over $200.
Tax credits for charitable giving are provided by all the provinces and territo-
ries in Canada with similar rules, but credit rates are different across provinces and
territories. Table 4.1 shows the charitable donation tax credit rates by province for
1997 and 2009, the first year and the last year covered by the estimation sample in
this research. At the provincial level, Que´bec provides the most generous credit rate
in 1997, which is 23% for both donation up to $200 and over $200. On the other
hand, Alberta provides the lowest incentive to charitable giving, that is, 7.74% for
the first $200 donation and 13.20% for the donation in excess of $200 in 1997. In
2009, British Columbia gives the lowest tax credit rate for the first $200 donation,
which is 5.06% and Ontario has the lowest tax credit rate for the donation over $200,
which is 11.16%.
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Comparing the tax credit rate between 1997 and 2009, the table indicates the
tax credit rates vary significantly over the thirteen years. For example, Newfound-
land and Labrador experienced a dramatic decrease of tax incentives for charitable
donation. The province reduced its credit rate for donation up to $200 from 11.73%
to 7.7% and donation above $200 from 20.01% to 15.5%. Most of these changes in
Canadian provinces and territories are due to the variation of marginal income tax
rate for the lowest and highest tax brackets, while others are due to different tax
policy reforms amended by each provinces.
4.2.2 Tax-on-tax Assessment and Tax-on-income Assess-
ment
Personal income taxation is shared between the federal and provincial governments.
Before the taxation year of 2000, most provinces collected personal income tax as a
proportion of the basic federal tax (i.e. “tax-on-tax”). Under this tax-on-tax system,
provincial governments impose individual’s income tax by multiplying the provincial
tax rate to the basic federal tax. Therefore, there is only a basic federal tax credit
rate for donations and gifts. However, in order to get the tax credit rate at the
provincial level, one can simply use the federal credit multiplied by the statutory
provincial tax rate. After 2000, most provinces switched to a tax-on-income system,
in which provinces levy their own provincial specific tax rates on taxable income. The
tax on taxable income option allows provinces to establish a unique tax structure
based on provincially determined tax brackets and rates (including, if desired, a zero
rate on a narrow first bracket) set independently of the federal brackets and rates
78
(Department of Finance Canada, 2000). This option would also allow provinces to
create a specific two-tier rate of non-refundable tax credits for charitable donation,
that is, the lowest non-zero provincial tax rate and the highest provincial tax rate
respectively.
In particular, this analysis takes advantage of the difference between tax-on-tax
assessment and tax-on-income assessment and examines the price elasticity with
respect to the changes in provincial tax credits when most provinces switched to
tax-on-income regime after 2000. In addition, some provinces have specific changes
during the sample period. For example, effective from 2002, Que´bec changed the
non-refundable tax credit rate for donations over $2000 to 24%. Ontario dropped
the personal income tax rate from 48% of basic federal tax for 1997 to an effective
rate of 42.75% for 1998. Alberta increased tax credit rates for donations and gifts
over $200 from 12.75% to 21% in 2007.
4.2.3 Ceilings, Carry-over and Transfer
It is worth to mention that there is no tax incentive for people whose incomes are too
low to pay tax. Also, the maximum value of gift can be claimed in one taxation year
is subject to 75 percent of the taxpayers net income for that year. Since the tax credit
is non-refundable, it provides no tax favoured assistance for donors whose incomes
are too low to pay any tax. It is often argued in the literature that the two-tier tax
credit system tends to provide a larger tax benefit to high-income donors than low-
income donors like the tax deduction system. This is because high-income donors
may be able to get lower after-tax price for donations because high-income donors
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are more likely to make larger donation than low-income donors and the higher tier
offers a higher tax saving rate.
Revenue Canada allows individuals to claim charitable donations in the year of
making donation or any of the following five taxation years. Taxpayers then can
maximize the tax benefit by aggregating charitable donation within six years. In
general, the optimal strategy may involve “bunching” claims in a single year, since
taxpayers can thereby maximize the amount eligible for a credit at the higher rate,
subject again to the offsetting cost associated with a delay in obtaining the value of
the credit (Duff, 2001).
Moreover, either spouse can claim the charitable donations made by either spouse
or their dependent, despite of who actually made the donation to the qualified donees.
For the tax purposes, it is optimal to claim the aggregate charitable donation by one
spouse in order to get a higher tax credit rate. That is, the pooling of donation
could allow spouses to exceed $200 cut-off, and the household could potentially get
a lower after-tax price for donation than if each spouse were claiming the donation
separately.
Due to the limitation of the estimation data sample, I only considered the 75%
net income rule for each household. Since there is no information in the survey that
tells when donations are made and who made it, I assume each household report
their donation in each year and the donation amount each household claimed in the
survey are the pooling of donation between spouses. However, there are also special
tax exemptions for certain gifts. Capital gains on the donated assets are eligible for
a tax exemption up to 100% of the net income. Assets eligible for a capital gains tax
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Figure 4.1
Household Spending on Money Gifts and Charitable Donation, Average Expenditure (Dol-
lars) by Selected Provinces, 1997-2009
exemption include publicly listed securities and certain exchangeable share, certified
cultural property and ecologically sensitive land (Department of Finance Canada,
2016). Those tax exemptions are beyond the scope of this analysis and therefore will
not be discussed further.
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4.2.4 Trends in Charitable Giving in Canada
This subsection discusses the general trends in charitable donations in Canada dur-
ing the sample year from 1997 to 2009. The analysis for trends was accumulated
from statistics reported in the household spending survey as well as federal individ-
ual income tax return.
As shown in figure 4.1, the average expenditure on charitable giving from each
household increased in general between 1997 and 2009. Que´bec, Ontario and British
Columbia are the three selected provinces showed in this figure along with the na-
tional average. Among these provinces, Ontario has the highest average for house-
hold donation and has peak of $2370 in 2005; On the contrary, Que´bec’s households
contribute the lowest amount of average to charity. In the early 2000s, charitable
donations dropped because of the economic slowdown and increased gradually till
2007. Except for Que´bec, there was a decline since 2007, when the last economic
recession took place in Canada, in the average expenditure on charitable donation.
Nevertheless, in the last year of the sample period, 2009, Ontario, British Columbia
along with Canadian national average recovered from the recession and increased
the average spending on donations, while Que´bec, on the other hand, has a reduced
average of $874 in 2009.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the trends of the number of people claiming the federal
charitable donation tax credit and the amount of charitable donation claimed as tax
credit from 1997 to 2009. This figure collects statistics from the numbers accounted
on federal individual income tax returns. The number of claimants remained steady
at about 5.6 million on average. Charitable donations reported in 2009 round up to
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Figure 4.2
Number of Claimants and Charitable Donations Claimed as a Tax Credit, 1997-2009
7.7 billion. The peak for charitable donations claimed was observed in 2007, which is
about 8.6 billion. Since 1997, charitable donations increased at about 5% each year
until the peak in 2007. Since the number of donors claiming charitable donations
only grew at a rate of 0.5% annually over the entire sample period, it would have
little impact on the expansion of charitable donations from 1997 to 2009. Thus, the
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growth is essentially connected with varieties in average expenditure of donations
from each household.
4.3 Data
This section of the chapter describes the main variables of interest and illustrates in
details about the after-tax price of a $1 donation.
4.3.1 Data Description
The data for the current research is from the Survey of Household Spending (SHS),
spanning from 1997 to 2009. The Survey of Household Spending is a cross-sectional
Canadian data set collected from private households in Canada’s 10 provinces and
three territories. About 98% of the population in the 10 provinces was covered from
the survey. In the three territories, the survey covers roughly 92% population. For
the estimation model, I append the thirteen years of data as a pooled cross-sectional
Canadian data sample. Surveys are advantageous, because they contain data on age,
wealth, education, affiliation and other family characteristics, which could be helpful
in explaining many aspects of giving by respondents. Conducted since 1998, the Sur-
vey of Household Spending collects income and expenditure data at the household
level for the preceding year annually. Information consists of households’ expendi-
tures on a wide range of goods and services including charitable contributions, money
gifts, pension contributions, health care, child care, taxes, and employment insurance
and so on. All those expenditures are collected for the family as a unit and the sam-
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Table 4.2
Summary Statistics for Continuous Variables
Variables($) Mean Min Max Std. Dev N
Total charitable donations ($) 483.56 0 60600 1440.98 161731
Donation to religious charity ($) 280.20 0 32000 984.42 95345
Donation to non-religious charity ($) 143.21 0 60000 601.41 95345
Real household income ($1000) 61.10 -11 819 47.31 161731
Number of weeks worked full-time
by reference person
25.94 0 52 24.22 161731
Direct health care costs ($) 989.50 0 56700 1411.08 161731
Child care ($) 368.37 0 55000 1442.06 161731
Canada/Que´bec pension plan ($) 1307.87 0 11463 1296.09 161731
Employment insurance premiums ($) 680.19 0 4442 628.54 161731
Registered retirement savings plan ($) 1321.93 -211000 120000 5406.43 161731
Provincial GDP growth rate (%) -2.83 -6.14 -0.93 1.35 160645
Unemployment rate (%) -2.56 -3.35 -1.71 0.38 157229
Source: Canada Revenue Agency; Department of Finance Canada calculations.
ple contains approximate a million of observations per year. The survey also collects
detailed information about demographic characteristics for the household reference
person and the spouse of the reference person including income before taxes, income
from earnings, government transferred income, sex, age group, marital status and
age of youngest children in the household etc. Data of charitable contributions for
religious and non-religious institutions is available from 1997 to 2002. Additional
demographic data such as educational attainment, disability of the respondents is
only available from 2004 to 2009.
reports the mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviations for the main
continuous variables from the unweighed sample. The mean value for total charita-
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ble donations per household is about $484 in Canadian dollars; of this total, mean for
donations to religious charities is $280 and for non-religious charities is $143. Those
three variables are my main interested dependent variables. The standard deviation
for the total of charitable donations is quite large, which is 1440. This is mainly be-
cause there exists a few high-income donors who make very generous contributions.
In the regression model, my main dependent variables take logarithm form. Given
that there are households that do not make any donations and in order to make sure
that the logarithm is defined, I add one dollar to the amount of donation for each
observation. In this chapter of the thesis, I study the joint donations between a ref-
erence person and his/her spouse. Since the after-tax price for charitable donation is
lower over $200, it is always beneficial for only one person in the household to claim
charitable contributions made by either spouse or their dependent in order to be eli-
gible to apply a higher tax credit rate. Because the survey is at the household level,
separate charitable donations information between a reference persons and his/her
spouse is not available. I assume married couples or common-law partners claim
charitable donations jointly given that it is generally the optimal strategy to earn
higher credit.
The current research incorporates most variables based on the well-developed
empirical literature on charitable giving into the regression model as well as addi-
tional variables which may have impacts on charitable giving but may not be com-
monly accessible to other researchers using other data. Average household income is
$61, 1904. Income is converted to constant 2007 dollars by using the consumer price
index (CPI) and is converted to the natural logarithm form. The average number
86
Table 4.3
Description and Measurement of Dummy and Categorical Variables
Variables Description of variables
male Dummy equal to one if reference person is male
RPAGEGRP Age group of reference person
mard Dummy equal to one if reference person is married
TENURE Dummy equal to one if reference person own the dwelling
URBAN Dummy equal to one if resident of urban area
year Year dummies from 1997 to 2009
BC Dummy equal to one if resident of British Columbia (default is Ontario)
QC Dummy equal to one if resident of Que´bec (default is Ontario)
Prairies Dummy equal to one if resident of Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan
(default is Ontario)
Atlantic Dummy equal to one if resident of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island,
Nova Scotia or New Brunswick (default is Ontario)
Territories Dummy equal to one if resident of Territories (default is Ontario)
HHSZTOT Household size dummies
ageyoung Age group of youngest child dummies
NUMYOUTH Number of youths 18 to 24 in the household
RPDisability Dummy equal to one if reference person has a disability
Highschool Dummy equal to one if reference person has a high school diploma
Source: Survey of Household Spending 1997-2009.
of weeks worked full-time by a reference person is around 26. In general, spending
on child care, Canada/Que´bec pension plan and employment insurance premiums
can be claimed at the same credit rate as charitable donation below $200 at both
federal and provincial level, I include them as independent variables in the regres-
sion analysis. Direct health costs and spending on registered retirement saving plan
(contribution less withdraw) are also included since they could potentially reduce
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the amount of disposable income that may otherwise made to charitable donation.
Finally, unemployment rate for each province and territories from 1997 to 2009 was
incorporated since it might pick up some cross-provincial unobserved differences and
take logarithm form. Unemployment rate is from CANSIM tables published by
Statistic Canada.
Table 4.3 presents the description and measurement for dummy variables and
categorical variables. Age groups for reference person start at age below 25 and
the interval for each group is 4 years except the last interval, which is 85 years old
and over. Household size uses dummies that take value from 1 to 6, with 6 being
6 or more members in the household. Table 4.4 further reveals the frequency and
percentage distribution of selected sample members’ characteristics.
4.3.2 After-Tax Price of Charitable Donations
The key independent variable, which is the tax price of charitable giving, will be
discussed in details in this subsection. I define the “tax price” of charitable giving
as the after-tax price of one dollar given to the registered charity. In the Canadian
tax system, both the federal and provincial governments provide tax credits for
charitable donations. Tax filers who claim donations to eligible donees receive a
lower federal and provincial tax credit for the first $200 donated and a higher federal
and provincial tax credit for amounts exceeding $200. The federal tax credit rate
is the same for all the provinces and territories in each taxation year; whereas, the
provincial tax credit rates are heterogeneous across provinces and thus so too are
the after-tax price of donations. For instance, if one who lives in Ontario make a
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donation of $200 in the taxation year of 2009, then each dollar donated to charity
generates tax credit of 15 cents from the federal government and an additional 6.05
cents of credits from the provincial government. As a result, one dollar donation
costs the donor an out-of-pocket amount of 78.95 cents. This actual cost to the
donor is referred as the tax price or the after-tax price of the one dollar donation. In
this case, the effective marginal tax credit for one dollar donated is $0.21. Besides,
if one who lives in Ontario make a donation more than $200, say, $300. He can
still claim 21.05% for the first $200 donated as tax credit; whereas, the remaining
$100 can be applied to a higher tax credit rates at both federal and provincial
level which provide him 40.16% of tax credit in 2009. Hence, his tax price of one
dollar donated to charity is 1 − (200 ∗ 21.05% + 100 ∗ 40.16%)/300 = 0.726 dollar
or 72.6 cents when he donated $300 to charity. The greater the tax credit, the
cheaper the tax price, and vice versa. All individuals who do not qualify for the
credit or who do not donate have a tax price of 1 dollar, in this case there is no
tax benefit associating with the charitable giving. Especially, the non-refundable
tax credit system in Canada provides no support for charitable donation made by
taxpayers whose income is too low to pay any income tax. Finally, the after-tax
price of charitable donation is measured in natural logarithms in order to interpret
the coefficient as an elasticity.
89
Table 4.4
Frequency and percentage distributions of sample members characteristics
Variables Category Frequency Percentage
Total charitable donations > 0 114311 70.44%
=0 47961 29.56%
Donation to religious charity > 0 37519 39.13%
=0 58367 60.87%
Donation to non-religious charity > 0 58809 61.33%
Gender Male 79,176 48.79%
Age group of reference person Less than 25 years 7,267 4.48%
25-29 years 11,871 7.32%
30-34 years 15,458 9.53%
35-39 years 18,753 11.56%
40-44 years 19,981 12.31%
45-49 years 19,052 11.74%
50-54 years 16,121 9.93%
55-59 years 12,730 7.84%
60-64 years 10,256 6.32%
65-69 years 8,864 5.46%
70-74 years 7,913 4.88%
75-79 years 6,603 4.07%
80-84 years 4,558 2.81%
85 years and over 2,845 1.75%
Source: Canada Revenue Agency; Department of Finance Canada calculations.
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Table 4.4
Frequency and percentage distributions of sample members characteristics (continued)
Variables Category Frequency Percentage
Marital status Married 101,261 62.40%
Tenure Own a dwelling 110,788 68.27%
Urban Living in urban area 127,208 79.25%
Year 1997 17855 11%
1998 15185 9.36%
1999 17051 10.51%
2000 14563 8.97%
2001 16698 10.29%
2002 14534 8.96%
2003 6977 4.30%
2004 13999 8.63%
2005 5945 3.66%
2006 14430 8.89%
2007 5060 3.12%
2008 9493 5.85%
2009 10482 6.46%
Region Ontario 21,628 13.33%
British Columbia 18,587 11.45%
Que´bec 21,465 13.23%
Prairies 45,979 28.33%
Source: Canada Revenue Agency; Department of Finance Canada calculations.
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Table 4.4
Frequency and percentage distributions of sample members characteristics (continued)
Variables Category Frequency Percentage
Atlantic 49,570 30.55%
Territories 5,043 3.11%
Household size 1 36127 22.26%
2 51571 31.78%
3 29620 18.25%
4 28842 17.77%
5 11364 7%
6 or more members 4748 2.93%
Age of youngest child No child 83725 51.60%
0-4 years 21402 13.19%
5-9 years 15772 9.72%
10-14 years 15136 9.33%
15-19 years 13315 8.21%
20-24 years 6645 4.09%
25-29 years 6277 3.87%
Number of youth 18-24 0 132416 81.60%
1 21931 13.51%
2 or more youth 7925 4.88%
Source: Canada Revenue Agency; Department of Finance Canada calculations.
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Que´bec is the most generous province in this regard, implementing a tax credit of
20% for charitable donations below $200 and 24% for charitable donations over $200
in the taxation year of 2009. But, residents in Que´bec qualify to receive a 16.5%
abatement of the tax they owe. For example, the federal tax credits for donations and
gifts in 2009 are 15% and 29%. If someone resided in Que´bec and made a donation of
$1 to qualified charity in 2009, then he could receive 15% ∗ (1− 16.5%) = 12.53% or
12.53 cents at the federal level. Combined with the provincial level of 20% of credit
rate, he could claim 32.53 cents for donating $1 in Que´bec.
Let
C(L) = CreditLfed + Credit
L
provin (4.3.2.1)
C(H) = CreditHfed + Credit
H
provin (4.3.2.2)
where CreditLfed and Credit
L
provin are the federal credit rate and provincial credit
rate for donation up to $200 respectively; CreditHfed is the higher federal credit rate
that is applied to donations over $200, and accordingly, CreditHprovin is the higher
provincial credit rate that is applied to donations over $200.
In general, the tax price tp for the donation of $1 is:
tp =

1 D = 0
1− C(L) 0 < D ≤ 200
[200
(
1− C(L))+ (D − 200)(1− C(H))]/D D > 200
(4.3.2.3)
93
where D is the amount of charitable donation. For people who make donations less
than $200, the tax price is simply set to be one minus the combined lower federal
and lower provincial credit rates; for people who make donations exceeding the $200
threshold, the tax price is determined by the amount of the charitable giving, and the
amount of charitable giving also relies upon the tax price. As a matter of fact, the
more one donates, the lower is his tax price. For this reason, ordinary least square
estimation would be problematic and the two-way relationship between the amount
of donation and the tax price leads to endogeneity bias in the OLS regression. To
solve the endogeneity bias, I instead employ two instrumental variables which will
be explained in details in the next section.
In addition, the tax price is also different for those individuals whose donation is
more than 75% of their net income because the tax credit can only be claimed for
charitable donations up to 75% of the net income of a person in a given tax year.
Therefore, the tax price of one dollar donation for individuals who donate more than
the ceiling is:
tp =

1 D = 0
1− 75% ·Net · C(L)/D 0 < D ≤ 200
[200
(
1− C(L))+ (75% ·Net− 200)(1− C(H))]/D D > 200
(4.3.2.4)
where Net denotes the net income for a household.
Table 4.5 shows the summary statistics for the after-tax price of charitable
donations in the sample, defined as one minus the taxpayer’s computed effective
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Table 4.5
Summary Statistics for after-tax price, federal credit rate and provincial/territorial credit
rate for charitable donation, 1997-2009, Canada
Variables Mean Min Max Std. Dev. N
After-tax price 0.7759 0.5016 1 0.1573 161731
Federal credit rate for donation up to $200 0.1578 0.1253 0.17 0.0118 161731
Federal credit rate for donation exceeding $200 0.2837 0.2422 0.29 0.0162 161731
Provincial/Territorial credit rate for donation
up to $200
0.1048 0.0506 0.23 0.0454 161388
Provincial/Territorial credit rate for donation
exceeding $200
0.1644 0.1116 0.25 0.0371 161388
Combined federal-provincial/territorial credit
rate for donation up to $200
0.2627 0.2006 0.3720 0.0384 161388
Combined federal-provincial/territorial credit
rate for donation exceeding $200
0.4480 0.4016 0.5 0.0264 161388
Source: Government of Canada, tax packages for 2001-2009 and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
Tax Facts and Figures for Individuals and Corporations 1997-2000.
credit rate given the observed expenditure on charitable donations, the federal
and provincial credit rate in Canada. For year 1997 − 2000, I collect the federal
and provincial credit rates from the Tax Facts and Figures for Individuals and
Corporations published by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. The credit rates for the
rest of the years are from the website of the Government Canada. The lowest
combined federal-provincial/territories tax credit rate for donation up to $200 is
20.06% which happens in British Columbia in 2009, whereas the highest combined
federal-provincial/territories tax credit rate for donation up to $200 is 37.2% which
happens in Que´bec from 1997 to 1999. The average tax price applied to one dollar
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Figure 4.3
Charitable Donation Tax Credit Rates for Donation up to $2001, by selected Provinces,
1997-2009
donation is $0.78, and the cheapest price an individual can get is $0.51. Namely,
individuals could get roughly 50% tax credit for one dollar they donate.
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 depict the trends for low and high combined tax credit
rates for charitable donations by selected provinces from 1997 to 2009. These two
figures indicate most provinces in Canada have experienced changes in tax credit
rates of charitable donations over the sample period, with more variation in some
provinces than in the others. For tax credit rates for donations up to $200, most
provinces experienced a decrease before 2001 and remain relatively stable afterwards.
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Figure 4.4
Charitable Donation Tax Credit Rates for Donation Exceeding $2001, by selected
Provinces, 1997-2009
For tax credit rates for donation exceeding $200, a similar pattern happens in which
most variation takes place before 2001 when Canada switch from “tax-on-tax” to
“tax-on-income” system. Among those provinces, Que´bec, on average, has the high-
est tax credit rate for charitable donation. In 2006, Que´bec reduced the cut-off point
above which the higher rate of tax credit rate begins to apply from $2000 to $200.
Consequently, the effective marginal tax credit rate for donation between $200 to
$2000 increased for residents in Que´bec after 2006. Another significant change hap-
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pens in Alberta in 2007, when the provincial government increased the provincial
tax credit from 12.75% to 21% for charitable donation over $200.
4.4 Empirical Model
The main objective of this empirical analysis is to estimate the price elasticity of
charitable donation across provinces and over time in Canada. To achieve this,
I pool the thirteen years of observations and estimate the tax price elasticity for
charitable donations with the baseline regression model below:
donationsijt =α + βtaxpriceijt +X
′
ijtΦ+ θt + ijt, (4.4.0.1)
taxpriceijt =δ0 + δ1Lowcreditjt + δ2Highcreditjt +X
′
ijtϕ+ γt + ζijt. (4.4.0.2)
The dependent variable donationsijt is the amount of charitable donation by
household i in province/territories j in year t. As mentioned earlier, I follow the
literature and take the natural logarithm transformation of donations such that
donationsijt ≡ ln(totdonationsijt + 1). The variable of interest is taxpriceijt which
is also taken in the natural logarithm form. The coefficient β measures the per-
centage change in charitable donation caused by a 1% increase/decrease in the tax
price of charitable donation, holding all else constant. Xijt is a vector of controls
including real income of the household, age group of reference person, marital sta-
tus, household size, age of the youngest child in the family, tenure-ship of dwelling.
I also include a variety of geographic variables in Xijt: dummies for five regions
in Canada, a dummy for living in urban area. Additionally, I include: number of
98
weeks that reference person worked as full-time, direct health care expenditure, child
care expenditure, Canada/Que´bec pension plan, employment insurance premiums,
number of youths, changes in registered retirement saving plan, provincial GDP, and
unemployment rate in each province annually over the sample period in the control
variables. In order to allow for “crowding out” by the public provision of public
goods, I include province-year specific government spending. Finally, θt is the year
fixed effect.
The price of donation is the price of one dollar spent after considering the tax
incentives. As I discussed in section 4.3, the tax price for people who donate more
than $200 depends on the donation expenditure as well as the federal and provin-
cial tax credit rates. Therefore, the tax price of donations for this group of people
is endogenously related to the charitable donation decision. As a consequence, the
ordinary least square estimation would be biased because of the endogeneity. In or-
der to address this endogeneity problem, I instead construct two instruments for the
after-tax price of $1 donation following Hickey et al. (2017) and they are the lowest
and highest marginal income tax rates in each provinces/territories from year 1997
to 2009. Since the tax credit rates for donations under $200 and donations above
$200 are the legislative lowest and highest marginal income tax rates respectively
at the provincial level, the tax price of one-dollar donation can be well predicted
by those two instruments. Especially, the critical aspect of the lowest and highest
marginal income tax rates are that they do not depend on the household’s actual
charitable donation decision and therefore take care of the simultaneous equation
bias. Moreover, these two rates are not likely correlated with omitted variables in
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the error term that affect donation decisions given the variety of controls used in
this model. The assumptions for this identification is that those two instruments are
correlated with the after-tax price for donations, but have no independent impact
on charitable donation except through the after-tax price, and are not correlated
with the error term. Equation 4.4.0.2 describes the instrument estimation at the
first stage. I also try an alternative method of constructing the two-stage instrument
estimation model which will be discussed in section 4.6.
In brief, the current chapter explores variation in the after-tax price of one-dollar
charitable donation generated in four ways. First, provinces and territories in Canada
have experienced changes in provincial tax credit rate of charitable donations over
the sample period. Second, federal tax credit rate of charitable donations varied
due to changes in federal income tax bracket. Third, residents in Que´bec receive
different tax credit rate from the rest of the regions in Canada. Last, for those indi-
viduals who donate more than 75% of their net income, the tax price for donations
are heterogeneous with the individuals who donate within the ceiling.
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4.5 Estimation Results
4.5.1 Baseline Results
Table 4.6 reports four different regression estimations2 for equation 4.4.0.1. The
results indicate that most parameter estimates are strongly significant. The price
of donations is the key variable of interest in the estimation. I report column one
as OLS pooled cross-sectional regression estimates. The first column of table 4.6
reports the results using total charitable donations as the dependent variable. The
OLS estimate of elasticity of donations with respect to the tax price is roughly
−13.032, and implies a 1 per cent increase in the tax price for donations would lead
to a 13.032 per cent decrease in the total charitable donations expenditure. This
result suggests a large and significant negative elasticity between the tax price of
charitable donation and spending on charitable donation from households. However,
an elasticity of approximately −13 is clearly too large in magnitude compared with
the result found in the previous literature. The coefficient for the tax price estimated
from the first column reflects the fact that the OLS estimate suffers heavily from
the endogeneity bias because of the way of two-tier tax credit system practised in
Canada. That is, households with higher spending on charitable donations will
also have a lower tax price of giving. In the event that we consider a person who
is thinking about giving one more dollar to philanthropy, the marginal benefit of
2The characteristic controls for each household in the baseline regression also include household
size dummies, number of weeks worked full-time for reference person, Number of youths in the
household, expenditure of registered retirement savings plan and private health care insurance
plans, child care expenses, spending of Canada and Que´bec pension plan and employment insurance
premiums.
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spending an extra dollar is much higher if that individual has given just $200 than
a person who has officially given more than $201. It is worth noting that passing
the $200 limit generally diminishes the expending cost of charitable giving by half.
The second column of 4.6 includes the year fixed effect for the OLS estimates.
The results suggest that individuals’ responses towards the tax price are unlikely
correlated with the year dummies in the OLS specification. The estimate for
tax price elasticity is −13.074, approximately the same with the price elasticity
estimated in the first column.
Column three and column four presents results using instrumental variables. I
use two instruments for the tax price of charitable donations: the lowest and highest
legislated marginal income tax rates in each provinces/territories. Both instrument
variables are independent of spendings on charitable donations. The IV results for
the tax price elasticity are uniformly smaller than the previous OLS results. The
estimated elasticity of tax price is −1.751 in column three. Column four repeats
the instrument variables regression including the year fixed effect. The estimate
for price elasticity of charitable donations is −0.701. By instrumenting the bottom
and the top marginal income tax rates, the estimates for the effects of the tax price
for charitable donations are much smaller, and more in keeping with the previous
literature. Consistent with theoretical hypothesis about the tax price elasticity
for charitable donations, all four coefficients for tax price are negative and are all
statistically significant. However, the year fixed effect confounding with region
dummies may take away the true tax price impact. To avoid omitted variables bias,
I instead replace the year fixed effect with general time trend variables in column
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three. These variables include the provincial GDP and the provincial unemployment
rate annually, and they could control for a substantial portion of the within-province
variations in charitable giving that are not due to the tax price. Therefore, given
the results of IV regression in column 3, my preferred specification reveals donation
will increase 1.75 per cent resulting from a one percent increase in the tax credit
rate. In all specification, I compute the robust standard errors and all the data are
weighted by Statistic Canada population weights.
The preferred estimation in column three also implies the household income has
a positive effect on the expenditure of donations. Charitable giving will increase
2.7 per cent if the real household income rise by $1000, ceteris paribus. But the
spending on giving are not economically responsive to household income squared,
suggesting insignificant non-linear relationship between donations and household
income in economic magnitude.
All socio-demographic characteristics appear significantly affect the amount of
charitable donations. According to estimation in column three, males donate less
to charities than females. For the most part, males gives about 21% less than their
female counterparts. This corresponds to most other studies on charitable giving.
Hossain and Lamb (2012) point out that female respondents are more likely to
make larger total donations and health donations than males in Canada. As found
in the existing literature, married individuals tend to donate more than those are
not married by about 26.8%. Tenure-ship of the dwelling also has a significantly
positive effect on the expenditure of donations since it is a reflection of wealth. The
age group dummies indicate that charitable giving increases with age. This is not
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surprising. As people get older they are typically more likely to give to charity and
to give a greater fraction of their incomes (Andreoni, 2006). Age can be a good
indicator of lifestyles-cycle dynamics. Disposable income of an older person will
grow via time as, for instance, children leave home, mortgages are being paid off.
Thus, larger donations can be made by older age people. The presence of children in
the household is associated with less donation expenditures compared to household
without children. In line with the conventional finding, respondents with children
aged 25 and above contribute least amount of money to charities when compared
to all other groups. This seems reasonable given that children at this age require
financial support of schooling from parents. Besides, for households whose major
source of income is from government transfer payments also donate least amount to
charitable organizations among other sources.
104
Table 4.6
Baseline Regression Results 1997-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Year FE IV IV Year FE
Tax price -13.032*** -13.074*** -1.751*** -0.701***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.022)
Real household income 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.027*** 0.026***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.206*** -0.204***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Marital status 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.268*** 0.243***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.596*** 0.630***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban 0.042*** 0.027*** -0.139*** -0.157***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age group
Ref: Less than 25 years
25-29 years -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.045*** -0.073***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
30-34 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.113*** 0.101***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
35-39 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.217*** 0.220***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
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Table 4.6
Baseline Regression Results 1997-2009 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Year FE IV IV Year FE
40-44 0.062*** 0.057*** 0.387*** 0.405***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
45-49 0.094*** 0.088*** 0.523*** 0.558***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
50-54 0.109*** 0.100*** 0.632*** 0.676***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
55-59 0.126*** 0.117*** 0.862*** 0.926***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
60-64 0.150*** 0.142*** 1.122*** 1.220***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
65-69 0.197*** 0.189*** 1.621*** 1.779***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
70-74 0.215*** 0.209*** 1.949*** 2.140***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
75-79 0.262*** 0.252*** 2.238*** 2.445***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
80-84 0.296*** 0.280*** 2.281*** 2.490***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
85 years and over 0.298*** 0.275*** 2.342*** 2.552***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
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Table 4.6
Baseline Regression Results 1997-2009 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Year FE IV IV Year FE
Age of youngest child
Ref: No child household
Age 0-4 -0.000 -0.020*** 0.057*** 0.123***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 5-9 0.001* -0.020*** 0.056*** 0.110***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 10-14 -0.010*** -0.030*** -0.082*** -0.057***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 15-19 -0.007*** -0.023*** -0.093*** -0.089***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 20-24 -0.020*** -0.032*** -0.110*** -0.151***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 25 and above -0.032*** -0.049*** -0.335*** -0.382***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Major source of income
Ref: All and other source
Wages/salaries/self employ -0.115*** -0.099*** -0.299*** -0.443***
-ment (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Investment income -0.024*** -0.001 -0.094*** -0.078***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
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Table 4.6
Baseline Regression Results 1997-2009 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Year FE IV IV Year FE
Government transfer pay -0.143*** -0.131*** -0.701*** -0.785***
-ments (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
BC -0.212*** -0.320*** -0.541*** -0.685***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
QC -1.196*** -1.105*** -1.162*** -1.014***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Prairies -0.512*** -0.819*** -0.192*** -0.643***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Atlantic -0.345*** -0.897*** -0.422*** -0.728***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Territories 0.000 -0.220*** 0.000 -2.106***
(.) (0.004) (.) (0.014)
Provincial government -0.757*** -0.585***
expenditure (0.001) (0.003)
Provincial GDP Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment rate Yes No Yes No
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.927 0.929 0.429 0.334
This table reports benchmark estimates associating each identification of charitable donations with tax price
for the years t = 1997−2009. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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This study also includes geographic factors, as was done in the past Canadian
literature. The Canadian regional specific effect is defined by six regions in the pre-
vious Canadian studies, they are: Ontario, British Columbia, Que´bec, the Prairies,
the Atlantic and the Territories region. Geographic regions influence charitable do-
nations at the intensive margin. Ontario in this case is the reference region. The
results show that the residents of Que´bec donate least amount of money compared to
the residents of all other regions, despite the fact that the tax credit associated with
monetary donations in Que´bec are much higher than in the rest of the Canadian
provinces. This result corroborates the finding in Devlin and Zhao (2017). Their re-
search provides a reason why Que´beckers appear to be less generous than others. The
empirical analysis unveils one potential reason: Que´beckers are less endowed relative
to other Canadians with two important characteristics: religiosity and household
income, and they are much less attached to a formal place of worship than any other
Canadians (Devlin and Zhao, 2017).
For the estimations in column 2 and column 4, I include the provincial govern-
ment fiscal expenditure for each year. The fiscal spending in each year is in million
dollars and is taken log form. The results suggest that provincial government spend-
ing has negative impact on individuals’ private donations. Although the data have
a limitation on the particular type of government spending, the negative relation-
ship between provincial government expenditure and households’ donations implys
government spending crowds out private donations. The crowding-out by the gov-
ernment spending of charitable giving has been examined in the empirical literature.
Andreoni and Payne (2011) conduct a crowding-out research using Canadian tax
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filer data. In this study, they show that the estimates of gross crowding out exceed
100 percent, among which 77 percent can be attributed to reduced fund-raising by
the charities. In addition, Day and Devlin (1996) find evidence that the level of
government spending influences the decision to volunteer in Canada.
4.5.2 Income Quintile
In this subsection, I split the the sample into five pre-tax income classes based on the
income quintile generalized by Statistic Canada in 2013: less than $13000, $13000
to $37000, $37000 to $65000, $65000 to $111600 and over $111600, measured in the
constant year 2007 dollars.
Table 4.7 shows the results by income quintile using my favoured instrumental
variables estimator. Relative to the baseline demand price elasticity of charitable
donation, the first quintile, that is the household which average pre-tax income is
below $13000, is less elastic. Tax incentive has little impact on the first income quin-
tile group because individuals in this group are not responsive to the tax price of
donations. On the other hand, the second quintile and third quintile are much more
elastic compared to the price elasticity of donations for the overall sample. For the
second quintile, increasing the tax price of charitable donations by one percent in-
duces donations to decrease by 3.586%. Similarly, charitable donations will decrease
by 2.264% resulting from a one percent rise in the tax price for the third income
quintile. However, the elasticity for the fourth income quintile is not far from the
estimate of the whole sample. Finally, the top income quintile performs the small-
est elasticity among all. One per cent increase in tax price for giving decrease the
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Table 4.7
IV regression results by income quintile
Income Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Tax price -0.591*** -3.586*** -2.264*** -1.364*** -0.284***
(0.062) (0.015) (0.021) (0.041) (0.082)
Real household income 0.011*** 0.059*** 0.042*** 0.023*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Real household income squared 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.242*** -0.160*** -0.096*** -0.165*** -0.301***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Marital status 0.163*** 0.209*** 0.103*** 0.351*** 0.118***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.012)
Tenure 0.825*** 0.426*** 0.356*** 0.290*** 0.422***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007)
Urban -0.341*** -0.195*** 0.068*** 0.117*** 0.587***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010)
BC -0.370*** -0.519*** -0.588*** -0.677*** -0.629***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
QC -0.704*** -1.193*** -1.372*** -1.357*** -1.492***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007)
Prairies 0.197*** -0.215*** -0.326*** -0.335*** 0.052***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011)
Atlantic -0.212*** -0.466*** -0.430*** -0.570*** -0.643***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.020)
Territories 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Provincial GDP -0.061*** -0.134*** -0.166*** -0.160*** -0.203***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Unemployment rate 0.620*** 0.250*** 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.521***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011)
Adjusted R-squared 0.306 0.538 0.385 0.282 0.188
This table reports income quintile estimations of charitable donations with tax price for the years t = 1997−2009.
The characteristic controls for each household also include age group of reference person, household size dummies,
major source of income, age of youngest child in the household, number of youths in the household, expenditure
of registered retirement savings plan, direct health care costs, child care expenses. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001.
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donations only by 0.284 per cent. Those results are consistent with the findings in
(Bakija and Heim, 2011). After allowing anticipation of and gradual adjustment to
tax changes, their estimates suggest there is a inverse U-shaped pattern of persis-
tent price elasticities, with somewhat higher estimates for middle-income people and
somewhat lower estimates for high-income people.
With price elasticities differing across income classes in Canada, fiscal subsidies
to the charitable sectors should base on different income group in terms of efficiency,
namely, the tax favoured charitable donations policy should target the middle-income
class. Since price elasticity for the middle-income class is relatively more elastic and
those individuals are more responsive to the tax incentives towards charitable giv-
ing, Canadian social planners could potentially raise aggregate charitable donations
attribute to the tax incentive exceeding the resulting reduction in tax revenues sub-
stantially from the middle-income group. The results also suggest that direct govern-
ment support may be a more appropriate method of providing charitable goods and
services to low-income group. As for the top income quintile, the estimates are diffi-
cult to interpret since observations in this group are relative few in number. Because
the data for very wealthy families are scarce, there are only few studies of charitable
donations by the very wealthy. One major difference between the wealthy donors and
the modest donors is that wealthy donors can and do apply more prominent control
over how their donations are spent. For example, the exceptionally rich can regularly
spurn existing philanthropies and make new philanthropies or establishments to suit
their own tastes.
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Table 4.8
IV regression results for religious vs. non-religious donation 1997-2002
(1) (2) (3)
Charitable
Donations
Non-Religious
Donations
Religious
Donations
Tax price -1.184*** -0.753*** -0.897***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.025)
Real household income 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.221*** -0.201*** -0.095***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Marital status 0.203*** 0.122*** 0.169***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure 0.632*** 0.512*** 0.412***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban -0.163*** -0.134*** -0.250***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BC -0.775*** -0.482*** -1.097***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
QC -1.322*** -0.981*** -0.980***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prairies 0.003 0.107*** -0.311***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Atlantic -0.563*** -0.296*** -0.753***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Territories 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
Provincial GDP -0.122*** -0.056*** -0.269***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate 0.840*** 0.644*** 0.748***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Adjusted R-squared 0.396 0.321 0.199
This table reports estimations of charitable donations for religious section and non-religious section with tax
price for the years t = 1997 − 2002. The characteristic controls for each household also include age group of
reference person, household size dummies, number of weeks worked full-time, major source of income, age of
youngest child in the household, number of youths in the household, expenditure of registered retirement savings
plan, direct health care costs, child care expenses. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p< 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001.
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4.5.3 Religious Sector and Non-Religious Sector
This subsection highlights the price elasticities of donations to philanthropy cross
different charitable sectors, namely, the religious sector and the secular sector. The
data that separates the religious section from the non-religious section is only avail-
able for taxation year 1997 to 2002.
Table 4.8 shows the results for religious and non-religious donation estimation.
The first column presents the result of the overall charitable donations from 1997−
2002. The tax price elasticity for donation is −1.184 from the preferred IV esti-
mation. The second column and third column present results for the non-religious
donations and the religious donations respectively. An one per cent increase in tax
credit will increase the non-religious donations by 0.753 per cent, and increase the
religious donations by about 0.897 per cent. Although the overall donations are price
elastic, the two separated sections are inelastic. The decrease in tax price (increase
in tax credit) will result in a smaller increase in the level of donation expenditure
in both religious and non-religious sections. The results suggest the amount of tax
revenue forgone will exceed the rise in donations spending except for total donation
expenditure. Most research recommends the price elasticity of altruistic giving is
much lower for religious organizations than for the secular organizations, proposing
that subsidies of any sort to religious donations are a wasteful approach to finance
religious organizations. However, the results from this study do not provide strong
evidence that the price elasticity of religious donations are less than that of non-
religious donations. As a matter of fact, non-religious donations’ price elasticity is
almost identical as religious donations’ price elasticity for taxation year 1997 to 2002.
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The finding that people are not price-responsive to religious donations is not surpris-
ing since generally people donate to church based on their faith rather than the tax
incentives. Kitchen and Dalton (1990) argue that the price of giving is seldom a
significant determinant of religious donations in a Canadian empirical study.
While the tax price has no obvious different impact on different donations sectors,
household income on the other hand has a relatively higher influence on the non-
religious donations than on the religious donations. Non-religious donation decrease
by 2.9 percent in response to a one thousand decrease in family income, whereas
religious ones decrease by only 0.5. Being a male has significantly negative effect on
both charitable sectors, although the estimated coefficient in absolute value is rela-
tively smaller for religious giving. It is also very interesting to see that households
live in British Columbia make least donations to religious charities among all the
rest Canadian regions.
4.5.4 Additional Household Characteristics for Selected
Taxation Years
The Survey of Household Spending provides additional household characteristics for
taxation year 2004 to 2009. The additional household characteristics include educa-
tion attainment of the reference person, disability of the reference person.
Table 4.9 shows the two-stage IV regression results3 for year 2004 to 2009. Col-
3The characteristic controls for each household also include age group of reference person,
household size dummies, number of weeks worked full-time, major source of income, age of youngest
child in the household, number of youths in the household, expenditure of registered retirement
savings plan, direct health care costs, child care expenses, Canada and Que´bec pension plan and
employment insurance premiums.
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Table 4.9
IV regression results 2004-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Disability Education Disability and
Education
Tax price -1.291*** -1.331*** -1.501*** -1.534***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
Real household income 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Reference person has a disability -0.222*** -0.187***
(0.001) (0.001)
High school 0.594*** 0.583***
(0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.193*** -0.188*** -0.176*** -0.172***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Marital status 0.325*** 0.320*** 0.319*** 0.315***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure 0.558*** 0.550*** 0.532*** 0.525***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.146*** -0.145***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BC -0.475*** -0.476*** -0.494*** -0.494***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
QC -1.150*** -1.165*** -1.130*** -1.143***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prairies -0.357*** -0.358*** -0.362*** -0.363***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Atlantic -0.473*** -0.471*** -0.476*** -0.475***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Territories -1.586*** -1.586*** -1.476*** -1.477***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Provincial GDP -0.188*** -0.187*** -0.194*** -0.193***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.376 0.380 0.400 0.404
This table reports estimations of charitable donations for religious section and non-religious section with tax
price for the years t = 2004 − 2009. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***
p< 0.001.
116
umn 1 shows the estimation without including eduction attainment and disability
as controls. Column 2 and column 3 incorporate disability dummy and education
dummy. I define the High school dummy as whether reference person have a high-
school diploma. Finally, column 4 displays the estimation with both of the two
dummies. The tax price elasticity is between −1.29 to −1.53 for taxation year of
2004 to 2009. As one might expect, having a disable person in the family declines
the charitable donations by about 20% compared to the family without a disabled
person. Disabled individuals who want to work generally face myriad barriers. They
face practical obstacles, and have fewer opportunities to get a job. Some of those
individuals who have disability may rely on government transfer to make a living.
Therefore, it would be difficult for them to have extra money to make donations
given the fact they have to cover their own medical treatment or medical equipment.
Education has a positive and significant effect on charitable donations. Refer-
ence person with at least high school degree is more likely to make larger donations
than referece person without a high school degree. The positive estimated coefficient
on high-school dummy conforms to expectations. Brown and Lankford (1992) and
Devlin and Zhao (2017) both find total giving increases with education level.
4.6 Marginal Rate of Tax Credit
In this section of the chapter, I will present a different approach of constructing
the tax price for the estimation model. As discussed in subsection 4.3.2, I used the
average tax price for a one-dollar charitable donation as the tax price for charitable
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donations. The cost of the donations is the price per dollar of donation after the
tax credit has been taken into consideration, also referred as the after-tax price. For
individual who make a donation, the tax price is equal to one minus the tax credit,
depending on the amount of their donations as well as the federal and provincial tax
credit rates.
Although the average tax price for a dollar is the most common tax price of
charitable donations used in the past literature, in this section, I instead apply the
last-dollar (marginal) tax price as the tax price of charitable donations. Because of
the uniqueness of the two-tier tax credit system in Canada, it is possible that it is
the lowest and the highest tax credit rates that influence people’s decision on how
much to donate at the margin.
Let tm denote the last-dollar (marginal) tax price for charitable giving:
tm =

1 D = 0
1− C(L) 0 < D ≤ 200
1− C(H) D > 200
(4.6.0.1)
For individuals who donate less than $200, the tax price of 1 dollar donation would
be one minus the lowest federal and provincial tax credit rates. However, the tax
price of 1 dollar donation for individuals who donate more than $200 would be one
minus the highest federal and provincial tax credit rates.
The results for the model by using marginal tax credit rate as the tax price
are illustrated in table 4.10. The reported estimates in this table are the marginal
effects of the tax price on charitable donations. Overall, the estimation results are
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found to be very similar to the baseline results in section 4.5. The first column
presents a pooled cross sectional OLS regression. The OLS estimated price elasticity
of donations is −10.855. The OLS regression estimate for the price elasticity is fairly
large compared to the conventional estimated price elasticity due to endogeneity. In
the second column, I include the year fixed effect in the OLS regression. Here we
can see the tax price elasticity is −10.879, which is not too far from the estimate
of the first column. Column 3 and 4 present the results of instrumental variables
estimates for the price elasticity. I use the statutory lowest and highest income tax
rates as instruments for the last-dollar tax price. The estimated price elasticity of
charitable donations in column 3 is negative and significant with an elasticity of
−1.183, implying 1% decrease in the price of the donations increase the amount of
donations by 1.183% on average. For the last column, I include the year fixed effect
in the IV regression. The estimate for price elasticity is −0.54. Similar to the results
showed in section 4.5, the reason that the elasticity decrease from being elastic to
inelastic after including the year fixed effect might be that the year specific effect
along with the regional dummies take away the major part of the variation in the
tax credit rate in each province over time.
In line with the baseline results, income, martial status, gender, tenure-ship
of home, age, age of youngest child, regional dummies and provincial government
expenditure all have significantly impact on the amount of donations that households
contribute.
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Table 4.10
Regression results for tax price as marginal credit rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Year FE IV IV Year FE
Marginal tax price -10.855*** -10.879*** -1.183*** -0.540***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.019)
Real household income 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.028*** 0.026***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.213*** -0.205***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Marital status 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.278*** 0.245***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.614*** 0.633***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban 0.011*** 0.004*** -0.147*** -0.158***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age group
Ref: Less than 25 years
25-29 years -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.046*** -0.074***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
30-34 -0.001 0.001 0.113*** 0.100***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
35-39 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.218*** 0.218***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
40-44 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.395*** 0.405***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
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Table 4.10
Regression results for tax price as marginal credit rate (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Year FE IV IV Year FE
45-49 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.534*** 0.559***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
50-54 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.645*** 0.677***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
55-59 0.118*** 0.113*** 0.883*** 0.930***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
60-64 0.154*** 0.153*** 1.150*** 1.225***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
65-69 0.234*** 0.234*** 1.666*** 1.788***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
70-74 0.288*** 0.286*** 2.008*** 2.152***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
75-79 0.344*** 0.338*** 2.303*** 2.458***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
80-84 0.345*** 0.337*** 2.344*** 2.502***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
85 years and over 0.367*** 0.357*** 2.409*** 2.566***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
Age of youngest child
Ref: No child household
ageyoung=2 0.023*** 0.005*** 0.061*** 0.125***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 4.10
Regression results for tax price as marginal credit rate (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Year FE IV IV Year FE
ageyoung=3 0.028*** 0.007*** 0.061*** 0.112***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ageyoung=4 0.008*** -0.012*** -0.082*** -0.056***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ageyoung=5 -0.002*** -0.020*** -0.094*** -0.089***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ageyoung=6 0.001* -0.015*** -0.108*** -0.149***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ageyoung=7 -0.029*** -0.046*** -0.344*** -0.384***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Major source of income
Ref: All and other source
Wages/salaries/self employ -0.107*** -0.095*** -0.303*** -0.445***
-ment (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Investment income -0.012*** 0.003*** -0.093*** -0.077***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Government transfer pay -0.210*** -0.201*** -0.725*** -0.792***
-ments (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
BC -0.221*** -0.324*** -0.551*** -0.686***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
QC -0.899*** -0.799*** -1.128*** -0.998***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 4.10
Regression results for tax price as marginal credit rate (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Year FE IV IV Year FE
Prairies -0.404*** -0.710*** -0.172*** -0.639***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Atlantic -0.377*** -0.853*** -0.428*** -0.727***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Territories 0.000 -0.153*** 0.000 -2.112***
(.) (0.005) (.) (0.015)
Provincial GDP 0.043*** 0.517*** -0.158*** 0.208***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Unemployment rate -0.248*** 0.262***
(0.001) (0.001)
Provincial govern -0.684*** -0.583***
-ment expenditure (0.001) (0.003)
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.892 0.894 0.392 0.325
This table reports estimations of a different version of equation 4.4.0.1 with tax price for the years t = 1997−
2009. The characteristic controls for each household also include age group of reference person, household size
dummies, number of weeks worked full-time, major source of income, age of youngest child in the household,
number of youths in the household, expenditure of registered retirement savings plan, Private health care
insurance plans, child care expenses, Canada and Que´bec pension plan and employment insurance premiums.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
In summary, the marginal effects from the IV estimations are similar to those
obtained from the average tax price elasticity from the earlier estimations. The
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results do not support the hypothesis that the estimates of the elasticity obtained
from the average tax price are biased.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
Since the taxation year of 1988, Canada exercised a tax credit system which pro-
vides the tax incentives for charitable giving to Canadian taxpayers. The current tax
credit system in Canada is different from the more common tax deduction system
practiced in most of the countries around the world. The tax benefit under the tax
credit system depends on the amount of charitable gifts claimed by the donors during
a tax year; whereas the tax benefit under the tax deduction system, in which most
countries employ, is determined by the donor’s income. While there are numerous
studies estimating the tax-price elasticity of charitable giving for the U.S, we know
little about Canada. Given this absence of knowledge and also the distinctive role
of the legislature and diverse tradition for charitable giving, estimation from U.S
research on philanthropy may not apply as a direct guide to Canadian policy.
The present analysis provides new evidence from the Survey of Family Expendi-
ture 1997-2009 in Canada. The empirical finding in this chapter demonstrates tax
incentives influence the households’ decision on how much to contribute to charita-
ble giving significantly, and estimated price elasticities fall in the range as those of
other literature in Canada and U.S. The results suggest that public policy can be
applied to increase private provision of charitable giving by the tax credits rates.
Since overall, the tax price demand elasticity is elastic and significant, the tax credit
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system in Canada appears to be fiscally efficient in the sense that the amount of
charitable donations induced by tax incentives is greater than the tax revenue for-
gone. There is no strong evidence that shows individuals that donate to different
categories of charitable sectors respond differently to the tax incentives. The present
chapter finds that secular sector is about the same inelasticity as the religious sector
for year 1997-2002. However, there is evidence of heterogeneous impact of the tax
price on different income groups.
Although the empirical specification in this chapter is to consider the across-
province and the over time variation of tax credit rates to identify the price elasticity
of private donations, it is also possible that unobservable factors, for instance, altru-
ism, peer-group effect, and different colonial culture of different region may affect the
level of giving. Moreover, the theory of “warm-glow giving” also offers an explanation
in giving. Humans are emotional, empathic and sympathetic-they enjoy gratitude
and recognition, they enjoy making someone else happy, and they feel relieved from
guilt when they become a giver (Andreoni, 2006). Despite their importance, those
motives mentioned above fall outside the extent of this research. Perhaps future
study can base on those motivations for giving and further improve the model of
philanthropy.
Another potential to extend this research is to get a closer look at the tax incen-
tives for donating to a specific category of charity, like art, cultural property or health
charity. Donations to different charities or organizations tend to reflect the social
needs and preferences. Recognition of the specific charitable sector can potentially
improve the tax incentive policy based on the levels of responsiveness of different
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category of charity to tax incentives. Learning about certain combinations of indi-
viduals’ characteristics affecting behaviour of gifts of a kind is helpful for improving
policies to not only increase the amount of the donations from existing givers but
also the number of new possible givers.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The contribution of this thesis lies in the combination of the fields of applied eco-
nomics and tax policy. The aim of the thesis is to closely examine the topic of the
private provision of public goods. The thesis has carried out an efficiency analysis of
the theory of crowding out by the public provision of the public good and the theory
of subsidizing voluntary contributions to public goods in the presence of optimal
non-linear income tax. The thesis also carried out an empirical study of the impact
of tax incentive on charitable donations in Canada.
In chapter 2, I build on the classic crowding-out model but departed from the
most previous research by incorporating the substitutional relationship between the
public provision and the private provision for public goods. In chapter 3, the disser-
tation makes an important contribution to the contemporary literature by identifying
the importance of voluntary contributions as part of the optimal non-linear income
tax policy. Finally, the empirical component of the research that is presented in
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chapter 4 has major implications for our understanding of the tax incentive regime
for charitable donations in Canada. Therefore, I hope to offer a more complete and
more accurate account of the Canadian tax credit system on the decisions of chari-
table giving from the main empirical findings that emerge from 4.
Voluntary contributions have for a long time been an important area of public
choice. In particular, understanding the welfare impact of private contributions on
the public good and the determinants of giving is essential for policymaking. The
main intention of this thesis can be extended in a number of directions. First, the eco-
nomic factor that influences people’s decision on charitable giving concerns not only
the tax credit but also the interactions between donation categories. For instance,
whether cash donation is a complement or a substitute for volunteering work? If
the hypotheses about the interactions between donation categories are correct, then
synthesis of the insights about charitable donation with the results reported in the
current thesis could shed light further on the fiscal-effectiveness; and allow us to
understand better how the social planner can influence the number of individuals
who make charitable donations as well as the average amount of charitable giving
by the existing donors. Furthermore, with improved data, I can further investigate
the impact of tax incentives on different donation types, for example, charitable do-
nations in cash, cultural property donations, giving in the form of capital gain. Tax
incentive could potentially have a very different impact on them in nature.
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